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Abstract 
Ecological Infrastructure (EI) refers to a suite of natural or semi-natural functioning ecosystems 
that deliver a range of essential services to humankind. Examples of EI are coastal dunes, 
catchments, wetlands, plant communities (fynbos), and riparian corridors. The Ecosystem 
Services (ES) supplied by EI are increasingly recognised as key to South Africa's sustainable 
development future. The term ‘Ecological infrastructure’ emerged as a metaphor to communicate 
the significance and the role of natural ecosystems in supplying a variety of valuable goods and 
services to people. Ecological Infrastructure is equally as important as built-infrastructure (for 
example, roads, dams, buildings) although built infrastructure tends to receive a significantly 
greater budget allocation for maintenance, unlike EI, which is assumed to be self-sustainable. If 
EI is underinvested, rapid degradation and threats such as unsustainable veld fire regimes, 
droughts, climate change, and invasive alien plants will persist in dominating the ecological 
landscape. The South African government established Natural Resources Management (NRM) 
programmes to encourage protection, maintenance and restoration of EI. However, the realisation 
that funding currently dedicated to the maintenance and restoration of EI nationwide is inadequate 
has led to the need to scale-up and unlock further public and private sector investments to 
augment ecosystem-based management interventions. 
The aim of this study was to improve the understanding of ‘Unlocking and Securing 
Ecological Infrastructure investments’ through a review of international experiences and similar 
models to NRM. The Systematic Literature Reviews (SLR) were conducted at a global scale to 
provide evidence-based policy advice, and were informed by both peer-reviewed and grey 
literature. The following objectives were achieved: (1) a review of the developmental needs and 
drivers behind decisions to invest in Ecological Infrastructure, as well as willingness of private 
landowners to participate and contribute to Ecological Infrastructure protection and conservation; 
(2) a review of policy context and institutional support mechanisms used to stimulate collaboration
and cooperation between government and private landowners towards Ecological Infrastructure 
investment; (3) a review of successes, challenges, and failures of implementation of Payments 
for Ecosystems Services (PES) as a conservation mechanism and; (4) drawing lessons and 
insights from reported cases of government and private landowner cooperation for South African 
Ecological Infrastructure investment policy advice. 
Results suggested that the need to invest is driven by the degradation of Ecological 
Infrastructure and the urgency to meet environmental and sustainable developmental goals. The 
willingness of landowners to invest and to participate is stimulated by the use of economic-based 
policies and compensatory mechanisms. Multi-sector collaborations, commonly known as Public-
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Private Partnerships (PPP), through public policy support mechanisms (compensation and 
incentives programmes) were found to be essential institutional arrangements used to protect EI. 
The review of Agri-Environment Scheme investment models showed that cooperation between 
the public sector and private landowners through public policy results in better conservation 
management, particularly when ecological desires and outcomes are prioritised through 
monitoring and evaluation post conservation interventions. The review of PES revealed strong 
institutional, social, ecological and least economic/financial successes achieved in the 
implementation. However, challenges and failures were also experienced in different countries. 
In general, inclusive stakeholder engagement in PES design and implementation, coupled with 
effective monitoring and evaluation, results in better socio-economic and ecological delivery. 
While PES has a better potential to generate funding for Ecosystem Services delivery, it cannot 
be regarded as a replacement of traditional funding mechanisms. 
The study contributes to the EI investment research agenda by recommending 
coordinated efforts to encourage EI investment from both public and private partners. This study 
further improves understanding of PES design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation in 
order to inform policy and provide insights required to improve EI investment mechanisms. 
Recommendations provided will help to secure financial resources, mobilise investments and 
reform policies. Key lessons learnt will also provide evidence-based advice for policy development 
and decision-making processes which seek to protect natural ecosystems for present and future 
generations through Ecological Infrastructure investments. 
Keywords: Ecological Infrastructure investments, funding mechanisms, partnerships, Payments 
for Ecosystems Services, economic-based policies, Natural Resources Management, policy 
advice  
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Opsomming 
Ekologiese Infrastruktuur (EI) is 'n natuurlike of semi-natuurlike ekosisteem wat 'n verskeidenheid 
van noodsaaklike dienste aan die mens bied, soos bergopvangs, vleilande, kusduine, fynbos en 
oewer-streek. Die ekosisteemdienste wat deur EI verskaf word, word toenemend beskou as 
essensieel vir Suid-Afrika se toekomstige volhoubare ontwikkeling. Die term 'ekologiese 
infrastruktuur' het na vore getree as 'n metafoor vir die betekenis en die waardevolle rol van 
natuurlike ekosisteme wat 'n verskeidenheid waardevolle goedere en dienste aan mense verskaf. 
Ekologiese infrastruktuur is ewe belangrik as geboude infrastruktuur (byvoorbeeld paaie, damme, 
geboue), hoewel geboude infrastruktuur geneig is om 'n aansienlik groter begrotingstoewysing vir 
opknapping te ontvang, in teenstelling met EI, wat as selfherstelbaar aanvaar word. As ekologiese 
infrastruktuur swak gefinansier word, bly dit agteruitgaan en bedreigings soos onvolhoubare 
veldbrandregimes, droogtes, klimaatverandering en indringerplante sal voortgaan om die 
ekologiese landskap te oorheers. Die Suid Afrikaanse regering het Natuurlike Hulpbronbestuur 
programme ingestel om die beskerming en herstel van EI, biodiversiteit en natuurlike hulpbronne 
aan te moedig. Onvoldoende befondsing vir die instandhouding en herstel van ekologiese 
infrastruktuur landwyd, het egter gelei tot die behoefte om beleggings deur die openbare en 
privaat sektor te vergroot en te ontsluit om ekosisteemgebaseerde bestuursintervensies uit te 
brei. 
Die doel van hierdie studie was om die begrip van 'Ontsluiting en Beveiliging van Ekologiese 
Infrastruktuur-beleggings' te verbeter deur ‘n oorsig van internasionale ervarings en soortgelyke 
modelle vanNatuurlike Hulpbronbestuur. ‘n Internasionale Sistematiese Literatuuroorsig van 
eweknie ge-evalueerde literatuur en grys literatuur is uitgevoer in die soeke na bewese  
beleidadvies. Die volgende doelwitte is bereik: (1) ‘n oorsig van die ontwikkelingsbehoeftes en 
drywers van besluite om te belê in ekologiese infrastruktuur, asook bereidwilligheid van private 
grondeienaars om by te dra tot die beskerming en herstelling van die ekologiese infrastruktuur, 
(2) ‘oorsig van beleidagtergrond en institusionele ondersteuningsmeganismes wat gebruik word 
om samewerking tussen regerings- en privaat grondeienaars te stimuleer vir die belegging van 
ekologiese infrastruktuur, (3) ‘n oorsig van suksesse, uitdagings en mislukkings van 
implementering van Betalings vir Ekosisteemdienste as 'n bewaringsmeganisme, en (4) om insig 
te kry oor samewerking tussen die aangemelde gevalle van die regering en private 
grondeienaarsamewerking ten opsigte van beleggingsbeleid in Suid-Afrikaanse ekologiese 
infrastruktuur. 
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Die literatuuroorsig toon dat die behoefte om te belê gedryf word deur die agteruitgang van 
ekologiese infrastruktuur en die dringendheid om omgewings- en volhoubare 
ontwikkelingsdoelwitte te bereik. Die bereidwilligheid om te belê en deel te neem, word 
gestimuleer deur die gebruik van ekonomiese beleid en kompenserende meganismes. 
Multisektorale samewerking wat algemeen bekend staan as Publieke-Private Vennootskappe 
deur openbare beleidondersteuning meganismes, is noodsaaklik om institusionele reëlings te tref 
om ekologiese infrastruktuur te beskerm. Die literatuuroorsig van die Agri-Omgewingskemas se 
beleggingsmodele het getoon dat samewerking tussen openbare en private grondeienaars deur 
openbare beleid tot beter bewaringsbestuur lei, veral wanneer ekologiese begeertes prioriteit 
gegee word deur monitering en evaluering. Betalings vir Ekosisteemdienste resultate het verskeie 
institusionele, sosiale, ekonomiese/finansiële en ekologiese suksesse behaal. Uitdagings en 
mislukkings is ook ondervind in verskillende geografiese gebiede. Oor die algemeen, inklusiewe 
belanghebber betrokkenheid by Betalings vir Ekosisteemdienste-ontwerp en, implementering, 
tesame met effektiewe monitering en evaluering, lei tot beter sosio-ekonomiese en ekologiese 
lewering. Betalings vir Ekosisteemdienste het 'n beter potensiaal om befondsing vir die lewering 
van ekosisteemdienste te genereer, hoewel dit nie as 'n vervanging van tradisionele 
befondsingsmeganismes beskou kan word nie. 
Die studie dra by tot die EI-beleggingsnavorsingsagenda deur gekoördineerde pogings aan te 
beveel om EI-belegging van beide openbare en private vennote aan te moedig. Hierdie studie 
verbeter ook die begrip van PES se ontwerp, implementering, asook die monitering en 
evalueringsdinamika om die beleid in te lig en nodige insigte te lewer om beleggingsmeganismes 
vir ekologiese infrastruktuur te adviseer. Die studie aanbevelings sal help om finansiële 
hulpbronne te verseker, beleggings te mobiliseer en beleide te hervorm. Kern lesse wat geleer 
was uit hierdie studie sal ook bewysgebaseerde advies verskaf vir beleidsontwikkeling en 
besluitnemingsprosesse wat poog om natuurlike ekosisteme vir huidige en toekomstige geslagte 
te beskerm deur middel van ekologiese infrastruktuurbeleggings. 
Sleutelwoorde: Ekologiese Infrastruktuur beleggings, befondsingsmeganismes, vennootskappe, 
Betalings vir ekosisteme Dienste, ekonomiese beleid, Natuurlike Hulpbronbestuur, beleidsadvies 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Ecological Infrastructure (EI) refers to a suite of “naturally or semi-naturally functioning ecosystem 
that delivers valuable services to people; for example, healthy mountain catchments, rivers, 
wetlands, coastal dunes, nodes and corridors” (Lee et al. 2014; SANBI 2014a; Cumming et al. 
2017; Kubiszewski et al. 2017). Degradation of Ecological Infrastructure has become a global 
reality of the twenty-first century, and measures to mitigate its severity have become urgent and 
a priority for governments and conservation organisations internationally (Lambooy and 
Levashova 2011). However, regardless of the fact that there are global conventions, initiatives 
and platforms dedicated to conservation and associated Ecosystem Services (ES), the current 
efforts to conserve have proved to be inadequate (Lambooy and Levashova 2011). Investments 
made in Ecological Infrastructure remain chronically insignificant despite its recognised 
importance (Iranah et al. 2018; Roberts et al. 2018). Amongst many approaches that could help 
to provide necessary resources, repeated calls have been made globally to get both private and 
public sector to share joint responsibility of managing and conserving Ecological Infrastructure 
(Sullivan 2013).  
The South African government is mandated by its constitution to ensure that citizens have 
a clean and safe environment where ecological degradation is prevented and natural resources 
are used sustainably, whilst promoting biodiversity conservation (Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996). This constitutional prerogative steered the formation of the Working for Water 
(WfW) programme in 1995. This programme aimed to control Invasive Alien Plants (IAP) in order 
to protect a variety of Ecosystem Services such as water resources, rangeland productivity, 
biodiversity, and simultaneously to create employment (van Wilgen et al. 2001; Marais and 
Wannenburgh 2008; van Wilgen and Wannenburgh 2016). WfW subsequently evolved into the 
broader Natural Resources Management (NRM) programme to ensure environmental 
management, conservation and protection towards sustainability whilst responding to local 
communities’ socio-economic needs (Department of Environmental Affairs 2012). The mandate 
of the NRM programme is three-fold: ‘contribute to economic empowerment, social equity, and 
ecological integrity’. To achieve this mandate, the NRM programme works with local communities 
to identify local opportunities (Skills development and employment) that will assist them through 
ecosystem-based management interventions (Marais and Wannenburgh 2008).   
A major portion of NRM funding comes through the Extended Public Works Programme 
(EPWP), which is primarily intended to address poverty alleviation (Turpie et al. 2007). This 
funding aims to achieve social and economic development (poverty eradication) and conservation 
outcomes (van Wilgen et al. 2011). Relying on EPWP funding to implement the NRM programmes 
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is deemed to be unsustainable because conservation outcomes become a side effect of poverty 
eradication intervention (Turpie et al. 2007). Sustaining NRM programmes requires more than the 
available funds to concentrate on the restoration of degraded landscapes and ecosystem services 
delivery (Shackleton et al. 2017). Acknowledging this funding gap and unsustainable dependence 
on EPWP funding enthused NRM programme managers to explore alternative mechanisms to 
‘unlock and secure Ecological Infrastructure investments’ in order to counteract the resource 
shortfall (Turpie et al. 2007). The first mechanism was to develop legislative frameworks to compel 
private landowners to be responsible for seed pollution (occurrence and subsequent 
establishment of invasive alien plant seeds beyond demarcated areas without cultivation), alien 
invasion and internalise associated costs and risks (van Wilgen et al. 2012). The legal frameworks 
in place are: the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act, 1983; the National Veld and Forest 
Fire Act, 1998; and the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004. The second 
mechanism was a Land User Incentives (LUI) model to incentivise private landowners to 
encourage land management and managing invasive alien plants (van Wilgen et al. 2012). 
Although these mechanisms are in place, an improved understanding of public and private 
cooperation and collaboration to achieve conservation goals remains limited (Cumming et al. 
2017). Poor integration of economic instruments when conducting NRM studies contributes to the 
funding gap (Marais and Wannenburgh 2008). Hence the review of international Ecological 
Infrastructure investment mechanisms to provide evidence-based policy advice for South African 
decision makers is vital. 
Ecological Infrastructure metaphor 
The term Ecological Infrastructure (EI) is largely used in South Africa, the synonymous concepts 
used in scientific literature to refer to EI are: Ecosystem Infrastructure, Environmental 
Infrastructure, Green Infrastructure, Natural Infrastructure or Natural Capital or Blue Infrastructure 
(Cumming et al. 2017; da Silva and Wheeler 2017). From an economic perspective, Ecological 
Infrastructure is a natural asset that is equivalent to built-infrastructure, which is intended to 
provide socio-economic services (e.g. power supply) for the improvement of human welfare (Doko 
et al. 2016). Given the need to secure public and political interest, and financial support for nature, 
the metaphor of EI emerged as an appropriate communication tool to be adopted (Maze et al. 
2013). Maintaining and preserving healthy Ecological Infrastructure is essential to South Africa in 
order to achieve among others, social, water and food security, thus realising the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) each of which the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) defines 
specific related development priorities for South Africa (Cumming et al. 2017).  
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Ecosystem Services  
Ecosystem Services (ES) is one of the modern conservation buzzwords used to describe the 
conditions and processes through which EI, and the species that compose them, sustain and fulfill 
human life. Biodiversity maintains these services and the production of ecosystem goods 
(Costanza et al. 1997, 2011; MEA 2005; Wallace 2007; Fisher et al. 2009; De Groot et al. 2013; 
Kull et al. 2015). The ES concept emphasises human reliance on nature, including economic 
products (Meyer et al. 2016), and supports decision makers to develop impactful conservation 
policies which enhance human welfare and the Sustainable Development (SD) agenda (Elmqvist 
et al. 2010; Kull et al. 2015; Costanza et al. 2017). The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) 
(2005) produced the scientific knowledge on how ecosystems impact human well-being and also 
established the interventions required to maintain and sustainably conserve ES (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1. A description of how the four categories of ecosystem services add value to human livelihoods.  
Ecosystem 
Services 
Description  
Provisioning 
services 
In combination with human, constructed and social capital, these services produce the raw products 
derived from ecosystems, such as food, freshwater, fuelwood, biological chemicals, genetic 
resources, etc.  
Regulating 
services 
These are the benefits derived from the regulation of ecosystem processes. In combination with 
human, built and social capital, these services include flood control, climate regulation, water 
regulation, water purification, disease control and regulation, pollination facilitation, and air quality 
maintenance. These services are commonly non-market although they add value to humans. 
Cultural services These are non-materialistic benefits derived from ecosystems; for example, aesthetic, recreation, 
spiritual and religious, cultural heritage and eco-tourism. They are closely bound to human values 
and behaviour, therefore, the value of cultural services is bound to vary or contradict among 
societies. 
Supporting 
services 
These services maintain primary ecosystem processes and functions, for example: soil foundation, 
carbon fixation, and habitat formation for fauna. They are essential for the production of all other 
Ecosystem Services. These may be considered as functions since they may be used as proxies 
for other services in other categories.  
Sources (MEA 2005; Wallace 2007; Fisher et al. 2009; Farley and Costanza 2010; Costanza et al. 2014; 
Crafford and Hassan 2014; Leventon et al. 2017)  
Note: This framework was originally developed by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005 as a 
metaphor to demonstrate social reliance on ecosystems (Gómez-baggethun and Muradian 2015). 
The above classification describes Ecosystem Services and the common factor is the contribution 
to human welfare (Table 1.1) (Costanza et al. 2011). The Ecosystem Services concept has been 
significant for landscape management, sustainable practice and decision making, because it 
integrates ecological and economic concepts to tie human economy with ecological systems and 
dimensions (Costanza et al. 2011, 2017). 
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Threats to Ecological Infrastructure 
Increasing rates of Ecological Infrastructure degradation are destabilising and threatening the 
natural flow of Ecosystem Services and Goods. In the end, the viability of socio-economic returns 
(e.g. human well-being) will be detrimentally impacted and ecological integrity will be 
compromised if degradation continues at the current rates. Degradation of Ecological 
Infrastructure, as well as loss of biodiversity, climate change, pollution, and loss of natural 
resources have become a serious concern to many conservationists (Ostrom and Cox 2010). The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) conceptual framework identified the following 
ecosystem degradation drivers at a global scale: “primary versus proximate, anthropogenic 
versus biophysical, dependent versus independent, and primary versus secondary”. Consequent 
threats include, but are not limited to: habitat loss and fragmentation, alien invasion, over-
harvesting, unsustainable utilisation of timber and other forest resources, and unsustainable 
agricultural practices (MEA 2005).  
The MEA framework indicated that human influence on Ecological Infrastructure is visible, 
particularly at a local level where people living within an ecosystem transform the state of 
ecosystems. The transformation reduces Ecological Infrastructure’s ability to provide essential 
Ecosystem Services and poses considerable economic and social repercussions, and this is likely 
to be a key challenge (Polasky et al. 2008). A typical example in South Africa is the large and 
growing environmental problem of invasive alien plants which negatively impact on biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services delivery, causing a significant and complicated conservation problem 
(Richardson and van Wilgen 2004; Marais and Wannenburgh 2008). 
Ecological Infrastructure investments 
Exploring Ecological Infrastructure investment opportunities is essential to achieve ecological 
restoration objectives (Blignaut and Aronson 2008; Tschirhart 2009; Iftekhar et al. 2016) and to 
maintain Ecosystem Services for present and future generations (Marchant 2014). Investing in 
Ecological Infrastructure requires a commitment of resources in anticipation of returns and net-
benefits in the future (Polasky et al. 2005). Generally, government institutions and the private 
sector (e.g. conservation Non-Governmental Organisations, corporates and environmental 
departments) invest resources for different motives: (1) profitability-investors expect their money 
back, often with interest; (2) they expect a positive change driven by the investment and (3) there 
is an intention to catalyse and attract other investors to address declining resource available. In 
the context of Ecological Infrastructure investments, resources invested may not promptly 
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generate financial returns but could be catalytic in enhancing environmental sustainability. For 
example, NRM invests in EI to optimise ecological integrity and alleviate poverty. These 
investments generate no direct financial income therefore they are not commercially viable. 
However, these investments add value to human upliftment and environmental protection (net-
benefits). For that reason, expenditure is financially defensible for public expenditure and 
investments. 
Viewing Ecological Infrastructure through an economic lens  
Ecological Infrastructure is characterised as a public good which supplies Ecosystem Services 
and benefits to an entire society, largely regardless of whether or not the society is keen to pay 
to enjoy these services and benefits (Kopsidas and Hadjixenofontos 2018). Over the past two and 
a half decades, NRM has invested social funds (~R 7 ,9 billion) through ecosystem-based 
management interventions to protect the Ecological Infrastructure, enhance the flow of Ecosystem 
Services, and increase socio-economic benefits in both public and privately owned landscapes 
(van Wilgen and Wannenburgh 2016). These interventions have been autonomously financed by 
National Treasury, without substantial contributions from the business or private sector (such as 
private landowners and private companies). The NRM interventions are justified on the basis of 
internalising negative ecosystem externality costs arising from both natural events and 
anthropogenic economic operations. Internalising negative externalities has been supported by 
environmental scientists and heterodox economists (socialist economists) concerned with 
Ecological Infrastructure loss in order to transform capitalism (Kull et al. 2015). 
Several studies (Hawken et al. 1999; Farber et al. 2002; Ostrom and Cox 2010; Blignaut and Elst 
2014) have concluded that economic practices tend to degrade Ecological Infrastructure severely, 
yet economics poorly addresses this loss. As a result, economists have recommended an 
integration of economic and ecological models in order to respond to this crisis (Higgins et al. 
1997; Bishop et al. 2009; Tschirhart 2009). The private sector has been put under pressure by 
governmental policies to invest in Ecological Infrastructure because of the negative impacts 
caused by their economic activities (Houdet et al. 2012). The application of economics in 
conservation is further substantiated by: (1) the need to understand the root cause of ecological 
loss and degradation, (2) the need to decide how much conservation is applicable, and (3) for 
accurate resource allocation to conservation (Farley 2010). Integration of economics helps 
establish Ecological Infrastructure conservation strategies and sets priorities to allocate 
insufficient conservation resources according to Return on Investments, (maximise intervention 
benefits with less resources spent) (ROI) (Polasky 2008). 
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Ecological Infrastructure Investment models: A precis for review  
In this thesis, a European EI investment model, known as Agri-Environment Schemes (AES), is 
reviewed to draw lessons to optimise public and private partnerships that might improve EI 
investment responsibility in South Africa (data chapter one). Both AES and NRM investment 
models have been commonly established by European and South African governments 
respectively for Ecological Infrastructure conservation and Ecosystem Services delivery. The AES 
investment model was chosen for review on the basis of its good reputation and because through 
it, substantial resources have been dedicated to farmland sustainability by European 
governments (Kuhfuss and Subervie 2018).  
Both AES and NRM investment models (through EPWP) encourage and support 
conservation programmes to protect the natural environment and to reduce agricultural impact; 
however, the integration of economic instruments to optimise efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
performance remains understudied. Obstacles to successful AES include poor monitoring, the 
prescriptive nature of the scheme, inflexible reimbursements, poor prioritisation of ecological 
results (Herzon et al. 2018), baseline data shortage, and methodological difficulties (Kleijn et al. 
2006). Despite the aforementioned obstacles, funding shortage is not constraining AES towards 
its goals due to favourable economic development and conditions, in contrast to NRM. To 
advance NRM investment interests, this study aimed to learn from global AES experiences by 
understanding institutional support mechanisms, policy dimension and context that might be 
adopted in an attempt to ‘unlock and secure Ecological Infrastructure investments’, thereby 
addressing the current status of insufficient financial support dedicated to EI maintenance and 
restoration in South Africa. 
The concept of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) has been chosen as a second 
investment mechanism for a systematic review. Globally, PES have a prominent reputation for 
being cost-effective; introducing new sustainable instruments for natural resource management; 
a win-win governance and policy tool to advance a socio-economic development agenda whilst 
achieving Ecological Infrastructure restoration and maintenance goals and for sustainable 
development outcomes despite a number of difficulties (Martin-Ortega et al. 2013; Carter et al. 
2014). Although PES schemes have received socio-economic and ecological recognition, these 
schemes have faced substantial criticisms (Chan et al. 2017). In this study, I characterise the 
successes of PES schemes as well as challenges and failures associated with PES programmes 
to pull insights and lessons to improve investments in Ecological Infrastructure in South Africa 
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(data chapter two). AES are also considered as PES, however, AES will be excluded when 
reviewing this chapter.  
Research Methodology 
The Systematic Literature Review (SLR) research approach was employed to comprehensively 
identify, evaluate, capture, synthesise and summarise studies, based on multiple threads of 
evidence in a highly standardised and reproducible manner (Sterling et al. 2017; Kohl et al. 2018). 
Comparative to traditional review methods, Systematic Literature Review presented rigorous 
methods that applied bias mitigation techniques, including inclusion of grey literature and 
snowballing (Haddaway 2015). The benefit of using systematic review is that it provides a guiding 
framework with a series of stages which inform a selection process. These include: planning and 
conducting literature evaluation; creation of a Systematic Review Protocol; search strategy; data 
extraction; data inclusion and exclusion criteria; data analysis and synthesis (Pullin and Stewart 
2007). There are major benefits for conservation in utilising this research approach because it 
provides a synopsis of the best accessible evidence to inform policy, research and practice in 
nature conservation (Sutherland et al. 2004; Bayliss et al. 2016). ATLAS.ti (v8.4) software was 
used to conduct qualitative data analysis. It enabled a visualisation of relations between the 
studied elements that emerged from the analysed data. ATLAS.ti is regarded as an essential 
utility for qualitative analysis, particularly for larger bodies of textual data. 
Problem statement 
The South African government must allocate its limited resources amongst many sectors and 
competing programmes to address socio-economic and environmental concerns. The 
Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DEFF) NRM programme funds Ecological 
Infrastructure restoration and maintenance programmes to achieve both conservation (ecological 
restoration and maintenance) and socio-economic (poverty alleviation and job creation) goals on 
one budget. Expanding this nation-wide ecological and social investment footprint is hindered by 
resource insufficiency, declining and inconsistent funding dispersal or budget allocation (primarily 
aimed at poverty relief) (Angelstam et al. 2017) and poor integration of economic instruments and 
studies in NRM research (van Wilgen et al. 2001; Marais and Wannenburgh 2008). These 
challenges are further compounded by the fact that NRM programmes are autonomously funded 
by the government with no substantial support from private institutions. However, the demand for 
Ecological Infrastructure restoration and maintenance is estimated to be six times higher than 
NRM’s accessible resources (Giordano et al. 2012). To date, a gap remains in terms of practical 
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economic policy guidance and evidence-based knowledge about other impactful funding 
mechanisms and strategies to adopt when ‘unlocking and securing Ecological Infrastructure 
investments’. 
Rationale of the study 
The rationale of this study was to contribute towards a better understanding of Ecological 
Infrastructure investment mechanisms. The study would advise NRM programmes through 
evidence-based policy advice. The review of international mechanisms of investments in EI and 
applicable funding models studied has the potential to inform South African policy makers about 
Ecological Infrastructure investment instruments. Understanding global cases claiming success, 
and the policy context used to enthuse societal Ecological Infrastructure management 
responsibility will be instrumental to the development of a conceptual framework for policy 
makers. This thesis documented valuable lessons learnt where government, in conjunction with 
private institutions, collaborated to assume a collective Ecological Infrastructure conservation 
responsibility. Results of this study would inform the NRM’s investment approach and help to 
optimise catalytic funding tools needed to upscale NRM work for better Ecosystem Services 
delivery in both public and private landscapes.  
Research statement 
This exploratory review is primarily open-ended and guided by no hypothesis nor statistical test. 
It addresses the formulated research questions while it is open to emerging ideas. Collaborative 
partnerships between government and private landowners or users will optimise Ecological 
Infrastructure protection, maintenance, and restoration towards ecological integrity and 
Ecosystem Services delivery. 
Research aim  
The overarching aim of this study was to contribute to the ‘Unlocking and Securing Ecological 
Infrastructure Investments’ concept by improving the understanding of potential investment 
mechanisms.   
Objectives 
The objectives of this study were to: 
1. review international literature on developmental needs and desires that inspire private 
landowners to accept responsibility for Ecological Infrastructure protection and conservation; 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 9 
 
2. assess the policy context that stimulates collaboration and cooperation amongst government 
and private landowners towards Ecological Infrastructure investment; 
3. review successes, challenges, and failures of implementation of Payments for Ecosystems 
Services (PES) as a conservation mechanism; and 
4. draw lessons and insights from government and private cooperation and institutional support 
mechanisms for South African Ecological Infrastructure investment policy advice.  
Research Questions 
1. What are the developmental needs that drive private landowners to realise the importance of 
investing in Ecological Infrastructure to protect their land?  
2. What international means or contributions (Investment willingness) have been made to 
counteract natural resource degradation by private landowners? 
3. What were the global policy instruments and tools that were formulated to encourage 
collaborative partnerships between government and private landowners towards Ecological 
Infrastructure protection? 
4. What elements optimised, complicated and hindered the execution of Payments for 
Ecosystems Services towards conservation outcomes and ecological integrity?  
5. What valuable lessons could be learnt from the findings to the above questions when providing 
evidence-based policy advice for investments in Ecological Infrastructure restoration, 
maintenance, and resource mobilisation?  
Study limitations 
This study was not intended to review every Ecological Infrastructure investment model, but only 
models selected for their high reputation and recognition as win-win policy tools, and potential 
vehicles to enhance ecological integrity. The results may produce generalisable lessons; 
however, most are meant for South African NRM programmes and Ecological Infrastructure 
investment efforts. 
Thesis outline 
Chapter One: Introduction  
This chapter describes the background of Ecological Infrastructure. It identifies threats to EI, 
benefits of investing in EI, and outlines the ongoing efforts to invest in Ecological Infrastructure. 
The problem statement, rationale of the study, research methodology, aim, objectives, and 
research questions are described here. 
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Chapter Two: Unlocking and Securing Ecological Infrastructure Investments: the needs 
and willingness to invest and institutional support mechanisms used 
This chapter reviews the developmental needs and drivers which necessitated investments in 
Ecological Infrastructure. A review of the investment desire and willingness to participate and 
contribute to investment efforts is presented in this chapter. The policy dimension and institutional 
support mechanisms used to encourage cooperation and partnership between government and 
private landowners are reviewed and examined. Lessons learnt are drawn at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
Chapter Three: Systematic Literature Review of PES successes, failures and challenges  
In this chapter a review is presented of the successes, failures, and challenges experienced in 
the implementation of Payments for Ecosystem Services as a market-based conservation 
instrument. It describes the institutional, social, economic and ecological performance of PES 
successes, failures and challenges. Lastly, it outlines the lessons learnt for policy development 
and efforts to design and implement better PES programmes. 
 
Chapter Four: Conclusion 
Synthesis of key findings and lessons learnt from the entire systematic review are consolidated. 
Recommendations are made for evidence-based policy advice necessary for Ecological 
Infrastructure investments. Concepts and grey areas warranting further research are outlined. 
Appendices 
The appendices provide extended data and information on the research methods, findings and 
other supporting materials used.  
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Chapter Two: Unlocking and Securing Ecological Infrastructure 
Investments: the needs and willingness to invest and institutional 
support mechanisms used 
Abstract 
Ecological Infrastructure (EI) is a natural and near-natural functioning ecosystem that delivers a 
range of essential services to humankind. Examples include catchments, wetlands, coastal 
dunes, and riparian corridors. In a world where Ecological Infrastructure is underinvested, rapid 
degradation and threats such as unsustainable veld fire regimes, droughts, climate change, and 
invasive alien plants persist in dominating the ecological landscape. Government restoration 
programmes have been introduced to encourage protection of Ecological Infrastructure. However, 
inadequate funding allocation for the maintenance and restoration of Ecological Infrastructure 
nationwide has led to the need to scale up and unlock public and private sector investments in 
order to augment ecosystem-based management interventions. For this study, a systematic 
literature review was conducted at a global scale to (1) understand the drivers behind decisions 
to invest in Ecological Infrastructure, (2) understand the willingness and desire of private 
landowners to participate and contribute to EI investments and (3) identify institutional support 
mechanisms in place to encourage investments. Results suggest that the need to invest is driven 
by degradation of Ecological Infrastructure and the urgency to meet environmental sustainability 
goals. The willingness to invest and to participate is stimulated by the use of economic-based 
policies and compensatory mechanisms. Public-private partnerships, public policy, and market-
based conservation instruments are institutional arrangements executed to protect Ecological 
Infrastructure. These include processes and systems used by the institutions to legislate and 
manage interventions towards fulfilling the conservation objective. The study contributes to the EI 
investment research agenda by recommending coordinated efforts to encourage EI investment 
from both public and private partners. These measures will help to secure financial resources, 
mobilise investments beyond monetary terms by coordinating planning and developing capacity 
and reform policies. 
Introduction 
‘South Africa is the third most biologically diverse country in the world’ (Gallo et al. 2009; SANBI 
2014; West et al. 2016) with a wide range of important ecosystems which deliver essential 
services to support humankind. Concerns about the rapid rate of environmental degradation and 
potential effects on society have triggered a need for substantial investment efforts to counteract 
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such impacts whilst advancing Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the National 
Development Plan (NDP) agenda (The NDP maps out specific development priorities for South 
Africa to reach by 2030. Examples of targets include commitments to reduce poverty and 
inequality; raise employment and investment; bolster interventions to ensure environmental 
sustainability and resilience to future shocks, etc.) (Cumming et al. 2017). To respond to this 
challenge, the South African government instituted Natural Resources Management (NRM) 
programmes to protect and preserve natural assets in conjunction with a poverty alleviation 
approach. This initiative was born through a constitutional imperative to safeguard the state’s 
natural resources for the benefit of current and future generations (Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996). Considering the legacy of the socio-political regime and injustices of the past, 
the NRM programmes diversified their resource management approach by prioritising the creation 
of socio-economic opportunities for previously disadvantaged groups. Due to joint goals of job 
creation and poverty reduction, the NRM programmes are funded by the National Treasury 
(Extended Public Works Programmes-EPWP) which is primarily intended to support poverty relief 
programmes. As a result, NRM programmes focus on job creation and poverty reduction while 
maintaining and restoring Ecological Infrastructure. The NRM programmes established 
operational support mechanisms to play an advisory role in its functions and core mandate 
(Angelstam et al. 2017). The MaReP forum (Managers, Researchers and Planners forum) is one 
of the arms used to ensure that NRM managers, researchers, and planners are collaborating 
effectively, communicating and establishing active partnerships to achieve NRM goals 
(Angelstam et al. 2017). Through the MaReP forum, the concept of ‘Unlocking and Securing 
Ecological Infrastructure Investments’ was raised. 
The term ‘Ecological Infrastructure’ refers to a natural or near-natural functioning 
ecosystem that delivers essential services to humankind. Examples include healthy mountain 
catchments, rivers, wetlands, coastal dunes and riparian corridors (Lee et al. 2014; SANBI 2014b; 
Cumming et al. 2017). The Ecosystem Services (ES) supplied by this Ecological Infrastructure 
may be regarded as equivalent to socio-economic services (e.g. electricity supply and health 
services) which are derived from built-infrastructure. These Ecosystem Services (ES) are 
classified into four main groups: Supporting (for example nutrient cycle, primary production), 
Regulatory (e.g. disaster mitigation, water purification), Cultural (e.g. spiritual values, aesthetics) 
and Provisioning (e.g. food, water) services (MEA 2005; Fisher et al. 2009; Farley and Costanza 
2010; Costanza et al. 2011). The concept of Ecological Infrastructure gained prominence in the 
NRM discourse because it carries an economics argument, which is essential to attract public 
attention for ES support and recognition through public and conservation policies (Bishop et al. 
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2009; Maze et al. 2013). Furthermore, this concept has the advantage of opening up 
conversations with the investment world too because it is a new generation of infrastructure 
essential to achieve developmental objectives such as water security, poverty reduction, disaster 
risk reduction and resilience to climatic changes (Browder et al. 2019). 
Investments in Ecological Infrastructure through NRM  
Invasive Alien Plants (IAP) present a growing threat to Ecological Infrastructure, biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services delivery (Le Maitre et al. 2002; Richardson and van Wilgen 2004; Holmes et 
al. 2005; Lange and Wilgen 2010). In response, the Department of Environment, Forestry and 
Fisheries (DEFF) through the NRM programmes, invests in Ecological Infrastructure restoration 
and maintenance projects to enhance Ecosystem Service delivery, whilst empowering and 
capacitating those employed on NRM programmes (Le Maitre et al. 2002; Marais et al. 2015). 
The NRM investment model uses incentives and disincentives [Land User Incentives (LUI)] to 
encourage private landowners to manage and protect Ecological Infrastructure on their private 
land (Cullis et al. 2007; Department of Environmental Affairs 2012; van Wilgen and Wannenburgh 
2016; Shackleton et al. 2017). Service providers are appointed to implement ecosystem-based 
management interventions (Turpie et al. 2007). This approach aims to facilitate ownership of the 
repair of degradation by both private landowners and the NRM programme through cost-sharing, 
broadening engagement with stakeholders and partnering with local authorities to encourage 
policy compliance (Blignaut et al. 2007; Cullis et al. 2007; Department of Environmental Affairs 
2012; van Wilgen et al. 2012). Cost-sharing and strong collaborative engagements are deemed 
essential to minimise the cost burden, particularly since NRM funding is constrained. In 2012, the 
demand for financing nation-wide ecosystem-based management interventions was estimated to 
be six times more than available resources (Giordano et al. 2012) and constant and long-term 
support for interventions is a costly exercise. 
The current South African conservation legislative framework (for example the 
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act, 1983; the National Veld and Forest Fire Act, 1998; 
the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004) requires private landowners to 
be primarily responsible for Ecological Infrastructure protection (such as land management, 
invasive alien plant clearing, ecological restoration, fire management, etc.) on their private land. 
Despite these legal requirements being in place, the contribution of private landowners towards 
public good investment is still insignificant (Turpie et al. 2007). Acknowledging this gap, a well-
subsidised and theoretically reputable investment model collectively known as Agri-Environment 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 14 
 
Schemes (AES) (Wilson et al. 2007; Dal Ferro et al. 2016) was chosen as a comparable model 
to extract lessons essential for NRM guidance on policy advice and operational matters.  
 
The context of Agri-Environment Schemes  
Agri-Environment Schemes (AES) are major sources of nature conservation funding in Europe, 
Australia and United States of America (Batáry et al. 2015; Meyer et al. 2016; Zimmermann and 
Britz 2016; Kok et al. 2018). They respond to agricultural impacts that threaten species, 
ecosystems and Ecosystem Service delivery (Kleijn and Sutherland 2003; Batáry et al. 2015). 
AES encourage farmers to protect Ecological Infrastructure and reduce ecosystem degradation 
pressures on farmlands through the implementation of specific Agricultural Environmental 
Measures (AEMs). AEMs are any environmentally friendly farming methods that supply 
Ecosystem Services. Farmers are financially incentivised for implementing AEMs (Kleijn et al. 
2006; dos Santos et al. 2015; Taylor and Grieken 2015; Meyer et al. 2016). Approximately £25 
billion (~R457 billion, May 2019) is dedicated to AES in Europe (Zimmermann and Britz 2016; 
Herzon et al. 2018), but despite the substantial funding, AES have poorly mastered cost-
effectiveness to improve implementation. Schemes are also challenged by a dearth of baseline 
data and rigid repayment arrangements (Kleijn et al. 2006). Also, little effort has been made to 
measure and monitor ecological outcomes delivered by AEMs (Herzon et al. 2018). Pressure to 
focus on the evaluation of the interventions is growing (Hajkowicz 2009), due to doubts about 
effectiveness and efficiency of AES (Kuhfuss and Subervie 2018). 
This study was driven by the realisation that NRM’s insufficient funding is linked to the reliance 
on one funding source and absence of other potential investors in the Ecological Infrastructure 
discourse (van Wilgen et al. 2001; Turpie et al. 2007; Marais and Wannenburgh 2008). Growing 
concerns posed by unsustainable veld fire regimes, droughts, climate change, and invasive alien 
plants, floods, loss of Ecosystem Services on South African Ecological Infrastructure have further 
stimulated efforts to understand the possibilities of supplementary funding streams. A systematic 
literature review was therefore conducted to explore (1) the developmental needs or drivers 
necessitating Ecological Infrastructure investments, (2) the willingness of private landowners to 
participate and/or contribute towards Ecological Infrastructure maintenance and restoration 
measures on their land and (3) the role of government support, policy regime and institutional 
arrangements to stimulate co-operation and shared responsibility for Ecological Infrastructure 
protection. The aim is to provide evidence-based conservation policy advice to inform decision-
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makers, scientists, policy-makers, NRM practitioners and various other stakeholders across 
conservation institutions about viable investment mechanisms to be explored when mobilising 
funds. Lessons and insights learnt from global experiences are presented to guide investment 
attempts. 
Methods 
A Systematic Literature Review (SLR) research methodology was chosen to gather scientific and 
non-scientific information (Pulling and Knight 2001; Pullin and Stewart 2007) to inform and advise 
the NRM policy interventions. The literature review was conducted at a global scale to access 
broader information. The following procedures were undertaken. Firstly, a Systematic Review 
Protocol (SRP) was developed to define the objectives of the review, to develop review questions, 
and to set criteria for inclusion and exclusion of sources and keywords (Dempster, 2003) 
(Appendix 1). The SRP described data extraction and synthesis methods. A PRISMA (Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) workflow was developed to show 
the selection and assessment of collected sources during SLR as per PRISMA requirements 
(Figure 2.1) (Moher et al. 2009). Search terms were then created to extract sources from peer-
reviewed (Web of Science, Scopus, Science Direct) and grey literature databases (Google and 
the search bubble effect where Google recommended and personalised the results according to 
the user preference) (Table 2.1). A pilot search was conducted prior to the definite search to 
improve the search strategy. The search strategy was then broadened to identify, evaluate and 
summarise all eligible sources where there were (1) driving needs to invest in Ecological 
Infrastructure (2) indicators of willingness of private landowners to invest and the relations 
amongst the determinants of willingness and (3) emerging institutional arrangements where 
government and private landowners co-operated to invest in Ecological Infrastructure as well as 
recommendations for securing and unlocking investments.  
The search terms were entered in combination with “Agri-Environment Schemes” in order to 
retrieve AES studies relevant to the NRM investment model. Truncated words, synonyms, 
alternative spellings, Boolean logic, and wildcards were used in the search strings. To minimise 
non-target articles, journals of less relevance to the searched topic were excluded (for example, 
engineering, political, medical, legal, health, etc. after scanning through their titles and abstracts). 
Search strings were customised based on different database specifications (Table 2.1), for 
example, Science Direct did not accept truncated words, as a result, they were entered in full. A 
“PICO” model was used to identify the Problem/Subject, Intervention, Comparison, and Outcome 
elements (Table 2.2). This literature search strategy tool further helped to define additional key 
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elements of the review (Cooke et al. 2012). The search was supplemented by a snowballing 
approach to gather more sources based on bibliographies of relevant articles, particularly for grey 
literature. Inductive (concepts emerging from the review process) and deductive (preconceived 
review concepts) coding methods were employed to extract thematic information from the 
literature. The limitation of my methodology is that I cannot fully guarantee the inclusion of every 
relevant study due to different languages and unavailability of full text resources of some sources. 
Table 2.1. Combination of search strings used to compile literature on Ecological Infrastructure 
investments needs, willingness to invest, and institutional support mechanisms.  
Note: * shows the use of wildcards or truncated words to retrieve alternate word endings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Needs and drivers for 
Ecological Infrastructure 
investment  
2. Developmental willingness and desire 
of private landowners to invest in the 
maintenance and restoration of 
Ecological Infrastructure 
3. Assessment of institutional support 
and policy mechanisms used to 
encourage the restoration and 
maintenance of Ecological 
Infrastructure  
“ecolog* infrastructur*” OR 
“ecosystem* infrastructur*” OR 
“environment* infrastructur*” OR  
“soft infrastructur*” OR  
“natur* infrastructur*” OR  
“green infrastructur*” OR 
“natur* capital” 
NOT 
“biolog* infrastructur*” 
AND 
“invest*” OR 
“financ*” OR 
“fund*”OR 
“sponsor*” 
“develop*” NOT 
“investigat*” 
AND 
“need*” OR 
“driv*” OR 
“caus*” OR 
“motiv*”  
AND 
“Agri-Environment Schemes” 
“ecolog* infrastructur*” OR 
“ecosystem* infrastructur*” OR 
“environment* infrastructur*” OR  
“soft infrastructur*” OR  
“natur* infrastructur*” OR  
“green infrastructur*” OR 
“natur* capital” 
NOT 
“biolog* infrastructur*” 
AND 
“means*” OR 
“capacit*” OR 
“willing*” OR 
“contribut*” OR 
“resourc*” OR 
“support*” OR 
“develop*” 
AND 
“partner*” OR 
“privat* landowner*” OR 
“landown*” OR 
“landhold*” OR 
“farmland*” OR 
“farmer*” OR 
“stakeholder*” 
AND 
“Agri-Environment Schemes” 
“ecolog* infrastructur*” OR 
“ecosystem* infrastructur*” OR 
“environment* infrastructur*” OR 
“soft infrastructur*” OR  
“natur* infrastructur*” OR  
“green infrastructur*” OR 
“natur* capital” 
NOT 
“biolog* infrastructur*” 
AND 
“polic*” OR 
“polic* tool*” OR 
“polic* instrument*” OR 
“polic* framework*” OR 
“legal framework*” OR 
“polic* mechanism*” 
AND 
“partnership*” OR 
“collaborat*” OR 
“co?perat*” OR 
“cooperat*” 
“institution* support*”  
AND 
“Agri-Environment Schemes” 
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Table 2.2. PICO model: Population/Subject, Intervention, Comparator and Outcome search strategy tool 
defined the search themes in a timely and sensitive manner. 
Population/Subject In all countries, Ecological Infrastructure (EI) in terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems. 
Intervention Investments in Ecological infrastructure: A process where various 
sectors collaborate, through policy objectives and practical actions to 
maintain and restore EI. Review the drivers of EI investments; the 
willingness of private landowners or stakeholders to invest and the 
institutional mechanisms established to encourage investments. 
Comparison Comparisons between South African EI Investment model (NRM) 
and other EI investment models in other countries (or Agri-
Environment Schemes). 
Outcomes Studies documenting developmental needs and developmental 
desires to invest in EI and institutional support mechanism used to 
encourage EI investments. 
 
Results 
In total, 751 sources were retrieved from Web of Science, Scopus, Science Direct electronic 
databases and Google search engine. The sources were methodologically screened using the 
PRISMA approach (Figure 2.1); this phase focussed on reading the article title, keywords and 
abstract. Subsequently, duplicates were excluded and the remaining 218 sources were read 
diagonally (reviewed introduction, tables and figures, and conclusion) or in entirety depending on 
relevance. Sources were assessed for eligibility after some were excluded due to irrelevant 
subjects, investment models, comparators and results and ultimately the PRISMA sequence 
distilled the hits to 124. These sources were then imported into ATLAS.ti 8.4 (2018) for coding 
and qualitative analysis. Many sources used were obtained from relevant conservation journals 
(Appendix 2).  
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Figure 2.1. PRISMA diagram sketching the results of articles at searching and screening phases from 
different databases and sources. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Study type: the proportion of selected studies which used different research methodologies.   
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Figure 2.3. PICO model: the percentage of literature sources which studied different components of 
research question and strategy, some focussed on the subject, interventions, comparison, and the 
outcomes.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. The percentage of reported literature on the use of institutional support mechanisms to 
encourage investments in Ecological Infrastructure protection in developing versus developed countries.
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Needs and drivers for investing in Ecological Infrastructure 
Results showed that various drivers necessitate governments, non-governmental institutions and 
private sector (in some occasions civil society members) to take initiative to invest in Ecological 
Infrastructure (Table 2.3). The motives for investments varied (2.3 in ranks) depending on investor 
type and tenacious natural or anthropogenic pressures, for example, natural disasters induced by 
global climate changes and agricultural intensification (land-use and cover change). The need to 
protect and conserve biodiversity and to mitigate agricultural intensification are amongst the 
biggest drivers of investments in Ecological Infrastructure (Arponen et al. 2013). Investments are 
mainly driven by Government, Private Sector and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) 
respectively. Livelihood enhancement through Ecosystem Service (provision, regulatory cultural 
and support services) delivery while sustaining the Ecological Infrastructure is also an 
instrumental driver of investment. Other drivers included adapting and mitigating climate change 
and natural disasters to decrease their severity and water resource protection (Bennett et al. 
2016). Government remains the leading investor to address all the categorised needs.  
Table 2.3. The needs or drivers that necessitate investments in Ecological Infrastructure by different 
investors. Concept categories were derived from Atlas.ti coding of N=124 sources derived from the 
systematic review. 
Concept 
category 
Ecological Infrastructure investment 
drivers or needs 
A frequency 
of mention 
(%) 
Types of Ecological 
Infrastructure  
Investors in ranks Natural or 
anthropogenic 
pressure  
Biodiversity 
Protection 
Enhancement and conservation of 
biodiversity  
Eradication of invasive species  
Protection of biodiversity on private land 
Habitat protection and maintenance  
Restoration of endangered ecological 
communities 
27% Wetlands 
Forests 
Endangered species 
Rivers 
Ecological 
communities  
Government   
Private Sector  
NGO 
Natural and 
Anthropogenic 
pressure 
Agricultural or 
agronomics 
Mitigation of detrimental impacts posed on 
terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems due 
to agricultural activities  
Address the impact of Land Use and 
Cover Change  
Mitigate soil erosion 
25% Terrestrial ecosystems 
Freshwater ecosystem 
Ecological landscapes 
Government   
NGO 
Private Sector 
Anthropogenic 
pressure 
Ecosystem 
Services and  
human 
wellbeing  
Protection of Ecosystem Services delivery 
(provision, regulatory cultural and support) 
20% Terrestrial ecosystems 
Wetlands  
Biodiversity corridors 
Government   
Private Sector  
NGO 
Natural and 
Anthropogenic 
pressure 
Climate 
change and 
natural 
disasters 
Lessen drought caused by climate change 
scenarios 
Reduction of Greenhouse gases 
Minimise flood risk 
Carbon sequestration  
Wildfire risks and extreme disruptive 
events 
14% Forests 
Wetlands 
Landscape/terrestrial 
ecosystems  
Government   
NGO  
Private Sector 
Natural and 
Anthropogenic 
pressure 
Water 
management 
Address storm-water challenges 
Improvement of water quality and quantity 
Protection of water catchments for 
biodiversity and human wellbeing 
14% Rivers 
Catchments  
Wetlands 
Government   
Private Sector  
NGO  
Natural and 
Anthropogenic 
pressure 
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Willingness to invest in Ecological Infrastructure  
The importance of understanding the desire and willingness of private landowners to adopt 
conservation practices, participate and contribute in Ecological Infrastructure investments is well 
recognised (Mills et al. 2018). This subsection reviews and assesses the willingness or desire of 
private landowners in conjunction with public institutions to accept investment responsibility. 
Factors associated with willingness determinants and how they relate to each other were also 
assessed. The reviewed studies indicated that private landowners’ enthusiasm is influenced by 
five main determinants and the strength of the relationship between these determinants. 
This study demonstrates that compensation measures (such as funding and other associated 
financial benefits) do encourage private landowners to participate and implement Ecological 
Infrastructure restoration and maintenance measures on their land (Russi et al. 2016; Weikard et 
al. 2017; Feng et al. 2018). Compensation measures are delivered through the application of 
Market-Based Conservation Instruments (MBCI), such as economic-based policies which 
incentivise participating private landowners to deliver Ecosystem Services and comply with the 
legislation (Figure 2.5). Socio-economic characteristics and advantages including land ownership, 
bigger land size, access to information, public awareness and advocacy were found to be 
significant in stimulating willingness to cooperate towards Ecological Infrastructure investment. 
Private landowners who are environmentally conscious, older, experienced in conservation and 
have a tertiary level education are more likely to participate and be the stewards of conservation 
(Figure 2.5. Conservation ethics, values and philosophy). Sensitive natural environments and 
distinctive features trigger conservation interest; Figure 2.5 shows that where there were unique 
environmental features such as endangered ecological communities, wetlands, marine assets, 
etc., more private landowners were keen to counteract degradation through investments and 
protecting a natural asset they value or rely on. Conservation activism displayed by civil society 
members and Non-Governmental Organisations also placed pressure on authorities and 
implicated landholders to make contributions towards investments. 
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Figure 2.5. A Cognitive Map from the review of determinants of willingness to invest in Ecological Infrastructure by private landowners and other 
institutions.  
Note: The key determining factors are presented in green boxes and the associated factors are represented in blue boxes. These determinants and 
associated factors emerged from the read sources, articles and journals (developed inductively). The linkages and relationships amongst all the key 
factors and supporting factors are described in arrows. The thickness of arrows and lines represent the strength of those linkages (through frequency 
of mention and association). The thicker the line the stronger and the thinner the lines the weaker the relationships. 
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Institutional support mechanisms to encourage EI investments 
(a) Public policy 
The review showed that public institutions and private landowners invest in Ecological 
Infrastructure through policy implementation, management, political support, and self-directed 
environmental awareness and support to advocacy by non-governmental organisations (Feng et 
al. 2018; Harrington and Hsu 2018). Generally, public policies emphasise regulatory enforcement 
and compliance which compel landowners to implement ecosystem-based management 
interventions in order to address EI degradation and ecosystem loss (Mcwilliam and Balzarova 
2017; Asantewaa and Xavier 2018). However, policymakers are designing conservation 
strategies which incentivise landowners to execute sustainable land use practices that deliver 
Ecosystem Services, minimise environmental risks and maximise socio-economic development 
benefits (Bremer et al. 2016; Galbraith et al. 2017; Sheremet et al. 2018).  
(b) Lessons learnt from Agri-Environmental Schemes  
Several experiences were drawn from the review of Agri-Environment Schemes. European Union 
state members formed incentive programmes to stimulate Ecological Infrastructure conservation 
and enhancement from farmlands (European Commission, 2013). Through Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), these programmes subsidise private landowners who voluntarily adopt and 
implement Agri-Environmental Measures (Hajkowicz 2009; de Krom 2017; Kok et al. 2018; 
Nielsen et al. 2018). Although AES are widely recognised as major instruments to curb 
degradation (Schroeder et al. 2013), some scholars criticise their efficiency to fully conserve the 
rural landscape (Latacz-lohmann and Hodge 2003; Kleijn et al. 2006). This criticism is due to the 
fact that conservation approaches focussing on individuals or farm level contracts are insufficient 
to achieve wider-landscape protection (Riley et al. 2018). AES have primarily focussed on 
incentivising private landowners to comply with schemes’ norms and standards (Action-Based 
Measures). The emerging literature (Schroeder et al. 2013; Herzon et al. 2018) suggests that 
payments should be driven by the desired results (Results-Based Measures) (Russi et al. 2016). 
This implies that private landowners should receive financial rewards based on ecological 
outcomes produced, for example a set of indicator species conserved, proof of Ecosystem 
Services delivered by conservation interventions, beyond Ecological Infrastructure friendly 
practices (Schroeder et al. 2013).  
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(c) Public-Private Partnerships 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are used as cooperative mechanisms to mobilise funding for 
public goods and services (Glumac et al. 2015; Ferraza and Coutinho 2017; Zhang et al. 2018). 
They require effective collaboration between local authorities and communities, government 
agencies, private landowners, private investors, business sectors, non-governmental 
organisations and individual civil society members (Franks and Emery 2013; Welsh et al. 2018a). 
PPPs have grown rapidly and have become essential vehicles to encourage private sector 
investments in conservation (Hardy et al. 2018; Welsh et al. 2018b). However, the current role 
and commitment of the private sector in long-term arrangements is still insignificant. As a result, 
PPPs are not mobilising sufficient funding to alleviate Ecological Infrastructure degradation (Yang 
et al. 2010).  
(d) Market-Based Conservation Instruments 
Market tools, economic-based and funding mechanisms have been formed to enable ecosystem 
goods and services delivery, economic growth, and development while protecting Ecological 
Infrastructure (Zammit 2013). These funding vehicles are known as Biodiversity Banks or 
Conservation Banks (Froger et al. 2015; Guillet and Semal 2018). They are guided by different 
policy tools, systems, processes and procedures in different nations. Examples include mitigation 
biodiversity offsets, mitigation banking, habitat banking, species banking, wetland mitigation, etc. 
(Coralie et al. 2015; Lapeyre et al. 2015). Their fundamental purpose is to provide compensatory 
mechanisms in the form of investments to counterbalance degradation, damage resulting from 
economic practices and developments, and to support interventions that deliver conservation 
outcomes (Voora and Venema 2008; Zammit 2013; Froger et al. 2015; Lamarque and Lambin 
2015; Vatn 2018). Investments accumulated are used for restoration, maintenance, conservation, 
and protection of Ecological Infrastructure and conservation of endangered species. Academics, 
conservation community and decision makers recognise conservation funds as Market-Based 
Conservation Instruments (MBCI) because they offer opportunities to create, restore, rehabilitate 
and conserve disturbed ecological habitats due to land use change or transformation (Hein et al. 
2013; Froger et al. 2015).  
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Table 2.4. Financing tools and funding mechanisms used to promote Ecological Infrastructure investments through Market-Based Conservation 
Instruments.  
Finance tool/Funding 
mechanism 
Description  Reference 
Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+)  
Greenhouse gas emitters pay a levy for forest protection. This funding tool monetises carbon stored in forests and incentivises 
developing economies for reduction of emissions associated with deforestation and to improve local communities’ livelihoods. 
Neilsen et al. 2018; 
Moros et al. 2019 
Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) 
This grant is precisely designed to protect and conserve environmental and natural resources in the developing world. The 
investments come with financial and impact targets. They require collaborations to ensure long-term ecological and socio-economic 
viability. 
NatureVest 2014; 
Cumming et al. 2017 
Mission Related 
Investments (MRI) 
These are investments made by foundations to achieve their philanthropic missions. They are fundamentally part of the legacy 
and grant of the foundations and are likely to cause a positive socio-ecological impact. 
Gartner et al. 2013; 
NatureVest 2014  
Climate Bonds/Green 
bonds 
Green bonds have grown rapidly and they have grown finances or liquidity of Green Investments. They are offered by the World 
Bank to promote large-scale investments to support global low carbon and climate resilience. Ecological Infrastructure maintenance 
and restoration projects could be tagged on Green bonds, however, investment returns must be clear and tangible for the potential 
investor. 
NatureVest 2014; 
DuPont et al. 2016; 
Clark et al. 2018  
Municipal bonds Local municipalities could set aside bond which funds Ecological Infrastructure maintenance and restoration to reduce future liability 
in the event of catastrophic or flood events. Municipal bonds enable public institutions to borrow money from investors and repay it 
through tax or other revenue streams. 
Spergel and Moye 
2004; Browder et al. 
2019 
Insurance products  Insurance companies could avoid severe cost through Ecological Infrastructure investments. For example, insurance companies 
have paid more than $200 billion (R29,7 billion-June 2019) in coastal flood damage in a decade ago. Risks could be minimised by 
maintaining and restoring Ecological Infrastructure. Better Ecological Infrastructure resilience would result in lower premiums. The 
government should work closely with the insurance industry to identify ways and products to enact this market. This further implies 
that companies making profits in ecological landscapes ought to be liable for any damages and pay through insurance covers. 
Bos et al. 2015 
Conservation banking Conservation/Biodiversity banks protect Ecological Infrastructure by counterweighing the anticipated ecological or habitat 
degradation due to economic development. They create net conservation benefits by maintaining, restoring, enhancing and 
preserving any form of Ecological Infrastructure such as wetlands, habitat or threatened or endangered species. 
Hein et al. 2013; 
Boisvert 2015; Froger et 
al. 2015 
Corporate Sponsorship Local businesses associate their products and brands with sustainable management of natural resources by contributing a 
certain portion of their revenue to natural resources management fund or investments. They position and brand themselves as 
socially and environmentally responsible and that attracts more clients to justify their price costs. 
Gartner et al. 2013 
Development banks funds  Development banks finance governments in developing countries where finances are limited. Since NRM’s approach to 
conservation promotes socio-economic development, development banks could be approached to provide finance. 
Ferraza and Coutinho 
2017. 
Note: This tables draws on the list of selected sources which presented specific insights (few are also found in the master database at the end) and 
details of the finance tools and funding mechanisms which have claimed success in financing Ecological Infrastructure projects across the globe. 
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Discussion 
This section interprets the implications of the results of the drivers of investments in Ecological 
Infrastructure, the willingness of private landowners to invest in Ecological Infrastructure and the 
support mechanisms in place to encourage investments. Lessons learnt and recommendations 
are presented at the end in order to inform and advise the natural resources managers and 
policymakers based on Systematic Review evidence. 
Needs and Drivers of Ecological Infrastructure investments  
When reviewing the most fundamental drivers or key needs for investments in Ecological 
Infrastructure, it can be ascertained that conservation, natural disasters, and socio-economic 
needs put pressure on various institutions and role-players to enact reasonable measures to 
protect and maintain Ecological Infrastructure. The prevalence of natural disasters and 
environmental risks stimulate conservation interest because vulnerable landscapes threaten 
different assets and economic practices. For example, in South Africa, the frequent occurrence 
of high intensity and extensive fires, alien plant invasion, and droughts have detrimentally affected 
natural/ecological assets and economic activities, particularly in the agricultural and forest sector 
(Forsyth et al. 2010). The systematic review corroborated the recognition of maintaining and 
restoring Ecological Infrastructure as a sustainable way of abating socio-economic and ecological 
vulnerabilities and risks (Hansson et al. 2012). Safeguarding a healthy Ecological Infrastructure 
to tactically address Climate Change related disasters, and Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) 
measures have become popular approaches in both ecosystems and livelihoods spheres in both 
developing and developed countries (Nalau et al. 2018). In its healthy condition, Ecological 
Infrastructure contributes to human livelihood improvement and enhances socio-economic 
development through Ecosystem Service delivery (MEA 2005). Results showed that drivers of 
investments in Ecological Infrastructure may be categorised as ‘natural’ and ‘anthropogenic’, and 
that these drivers require both public and private investment attention. Therefore, maintenance 
and restoration of Ecological Infrastructure complement land productivity, economic growth, and 
safeguard food security. Both private and public institutions are anticipated to devise and 
implement effective ecosystem-based management interventions, ranging from policies to 
programmes that mitigate Ecological Infrastructure degradation.  
Willingness and desire to invest in Ecological Infrastructure  
Although the investment contributions could not be quantified, (because the study’s scope was 
limited to the systematic literature review, not a meta-analysis of investment capacity), the results 
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revealed that private landowners are willing to participate and invest in Ecological Infrastructure 
provided there are compensation measures in place. Financial incentives and funding are 
generally provided by the government to private landowners who deliver Ecosystem Services by 
managing Ecological Infrastructure. This analysis, therefore, suggests that incentive-based 
policies play a pivotal role in encouraging the willingness to participate in EI programmes 
(Kanchanaroek and Aslam 2018). Beyond awarding economic incentives to attract public and 
stakeholder participation, there are critical determinants which define possibilities of being a 
landscape steward or not. Conservation ethics, values and philosophy either encourage or 
discourage participation and acceptance of the responsibility to restore and maintain Ecological 
Infrastructure. Where social conditions are favourable, private landowners are more likely to take 
responsibility for conservation of EI. These conditions include land rights, land ownership and 
tenure security; access to information in order to awaken conservation interest; bigger farm sizes; 
higher levels of education and communication and advocacy support from both conservation 
organisations and government; active neighbourhood networks; private landowner conservation 
consciousness and interest as well as unique and prominent biophysical environment and 
features (Franzén et al. 2015; Yeboah et al. 2015; Ma et al. 2018; Welsh et al. 2018; Zhang and 
Han 2018; Sweikert and Gigliotti 2019). Considering the above determinants, environmental 
education and awareness campaigns, advocacy, and communication are vital to support 
conservation interest and willingness to invest. Stakeholder relations and effective community 
engagements stimulate a willingness to join conservation initiatives. The establishment of 
economic-based instruments that offer incentives is therefore instrumental in stimulating 
willingness to invest in EI. However, these must be intertwined with regulatory and law 
enforcement approaches that seek to protect the EI. 
Institutional support mechanisms and policy regime 
The results revealed that diverse investment instruments are executed by either public institutions 
or through private institutions to manage Ecological Infrastructure in both public and private 
landscapes. Major institutional investments are financial mechanisms and policy frameworks. 
Through these investments, conservation programmes and funds are established to achieve 
conservation goals for Ecological Infrastructure while enhancing economic and social prosperity 
(Rode et al. 2016). This dual approach is essential amongst developing economies where 
conservation programmes are anticipated to deliver both ecological and socio-economic 
deliverables on one budget (Hejnowicz et al. 2014) (However, my results showed a slow uptake 
of market-based mechanisms in developing nations as compared to developed world, see Figure 
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2.4). Where ‘win-win’ solutions are expected, a comprehensive approach is applied to gather 
different stakeholders to form Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) to mobilise funds from multiple 
sources (Zhang et al. 2018). PPPs’ popularity is growing in the conservation community due to 
shrinking funding (Glumac et al. 2015; Guillet and Semal 2018) and a desire to strengthen 
partnerships with the private sector. This investment approach could lead to a long-term 
collaboration and partnership between the public and private sector, however, prior to formal 
agreement all partners must have an equal understanding of goals and anticipated outcomes of 
a partnership to avoid conflict (Glumac et al. 2015). The key potential role-players in these 
partnerships are envisaged to be communities, government agencies, private landowners or 
users, private investors, business sector, non-governmental organisations and individual civil 
society members and other relevant or interested groups. For the South African context, NRM 
should reinvigorate institutional relations with other national departments that hold a coinciding 
conservation mandate. These national departments that include (1) Department of Environment, 
Forestry and Fisheries; (2) Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development; (3) Human 
Settlements, Water and Sanitation (website links in blue) are entrusted with the following 
conservation responsibilities respectively (1) Ensure healthy and protected environment for the 
benefit of present and future generations by providing leadership in environmental management, 
sustainability and conservation; (2) Ensure the protection, rehabilitation, conservation and 
recovery of depleted and degraded natural resources; (2) Promote sustainable use of natural 
resources for food security and rural development and (3) Promote efficient and effective 
management of water resources to ensure sustainable socio-economic development. Concerned 
departments could commit funds and cooperate in the coordination of institutional arrangements 
which seek to implement and monitor Ecological Infrastructure restoration and maintenance 
programmes. Projects such as, Land Care, Adopt-a-River and the ‘Working for… programmes’ 
ought to be integrated through planning and prioritisation approaches (DEA and SANBI 2016).  
This review showed a shift away from command and control [which emphasises policy compliance 
(Davis and Gartside 2001)] to economic-based instruments which reward voluntary contributors 
to Ecosystem Services (ES) maintenance (Boisvert 2015; Hrabanski 2015; Mills et al. 2018). 
These instruments go beyond compensating private landowners for avoiding practices or 
operations that potentially damage Ecological Infrastructure. This approach suggests that 
investments made in the restoration and maintenance of Ecological Infrastructure must be 
justified, therefore natural resources management programmes should put emphasis on 
rewarding ecosystem-based management interventions based on ecological outcomes. 
Programmes such as Agri-Environmental Schemes (Europe), United States Conservation 
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Reserve Program (United States) and National Market-Based Instruments Pilot Programme 
(Australia) use a range of different measures and indicators to test ecological outcomes and 
benefits from EI management (Hajkowicz 2009; Yang et al. 2010). It can be reiterated that 
Results-Based Programmes (RBP) are more efficient and justifiable than Action-Based 
Programmes (ABP) and failing to provide evidence will jeopardise possibilities of making the 
ecological investment case if outcomes are not a priority. 
 
Figure 2.6. Frequency of mention and use of economic-based strategies, policy enforcement, and 
compliance and public-private partnerships by the literature over the past two decades. 
The above description holds an implication for South African NRM programmes. It is 
imperative for NRM ‘working for programmes’ (for example Working for Water) to define 
monitoring measures that demonstrate positive ecological outcomes emanating from the 
interventions. Anticipated outcomes and monitoring protocols must be clarified accordingly. 
Dedicated data collectors and data analysts should define indicators and present the information 
to key and potential stakeholders within and beyond NRM in order to secure their buy-in (Bremer 
et al. 2016). Intervention viability and precise demonstration of Return on Investment (ROI) could 
be a convincing and instrumental tool when sourcing finances from the private sector and other 
vital stakeholders for EI interventions. 
Recommendations and policy implications 
Several recommendations were extracted from the review to inform conservation policy and 
decision makers about available evidence and insights necessary for ‘unlocking and securing 
Ecological Infrastructure investments’. It is important to note that these recommendations may 
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vary between countries depending on policies and current Ecological Infrastructure maintenance 
and restoration approaches.   
 Ecological Infrastructure investment funds should be clear on anticipated outcomes 
and set precise monitoring plan and indicators. Application of rapidly evolving remote 
sensing satellite imagery coupled with site inspection could monitor ecological changes 
(Pagiola et al. 2007). For example, the NRM ‘working for... programmes’ could consider 
experimental and monitoring designs to compare areas with ecosystem-based management 
interventions to areas without. Outcomes will demonstrate whether interventions did achieve 
the set investment goals or not. Evidence of returns and benefits would attract the interest of 
investors. Results-driven ecosystem management interventions are widely gaining popularity 
in the conservation community more than action-driven ecosystem management interventions 
(Salles et al. 2017; Thompson 2017; Herzon et al. 2018; Sidemo-Holm et al. 2018). 
Implementers of ‘working for… programmes’ should have dedicated data collectors and 
analysts to measure the impact made by the current programmes and they should interpret 
the indicators for private landowners and other interested stakeholders. The review showed 
that private landowners’ motivation to co-fund is induced by Returns on Investments.  
 Biodiversity Stewardship programmes in the management of Ecological Infrastructure 
is vital. Through a holistic landscape conservation approach, a group of landowners could be 
assigned an ecological landscape to maintain collectively. Payment and incentives could be 
distributed and shared evenly. The success of this approach relies on local private landowner 
participation and their vision to achieve success. 
 Strengthen advocacy and communications in order to improve awareness, build 
capacity and awaken conservation interest. Clear messaging on Ecological Infrastructure 
maintenance and restoration benefits is likely to leverage political and social support for 
investment in Ecological Infrastructure. 
 Formation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) could scale up investments. Mobilised 
funds could establish risk mitigation support mechanisms to protect businesses, deliver 
Ecosystem Services and, enhance long term protection of Ecological Infrastructure. Various 
disciplines and stakeholders (environmental, water sector, insurance companies, corporate 
institutions, and philanthropists, etc.) need to cooperate and contribute from their experiences 
and financial resources.  
 South African national departments with overlapping conservation mandates (for 
example, Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries; Human Settlements, 
Water and Sanitation; Mineral Resources and Energy; Agriculture, Land Reform and 
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Rural Development) should break silos by strengthening conservation engagements 
and collaborative partnerships (Angelstam et al. 2017). To facilitate coordination of 
investments for conservation interventions, these departments should synchronise spatial 
planning cooperatively and channel resources where there are critical interventions identified. 
 Utilise Community of Practice platforms (e.g. MaReP Forums) where knowledge and 
learning exchange happen between conservationists, researchers, managers, 
planners, private sector and funding organisations. This platform presents a networking 
opportunity for conservationists and investors and potential funders. 
Strategic and effective engagement of key role players is essential to ensure that Ecological 
Infrastructure maintenance and restoration programmes and policies are holistic and able to 
achieve conservation goals in integrated landscapes. Well-designed Ecological Infrastructure 
investment policies could ignite willingness of private landowners and other related partners to 
invest in EI. 
Conclusion  
Demanding development needs drive both governments and private landowners to invest and 
support improved functionality of Ecological Infrastructure. The drivers for investment in EI are 
orientated towards improving Ecosystem Services and human-wellbeing. Private landowner 
participation and engagement is crucial in the management of Ecological Infrastructure. Private 
landowner willingness to engage and contribute is stimulated by economic and ecological returns. 
Financial incentives, compensation, and favourable social conditions play a significant role in 
encouraging private landowners to voluntarily implement interventions and programmes. This 
review supports and contributes to the evidence-based policy advice by highlighting the measures 
to instil collaborative partnerships and collective efforts between government and private 
landowners to maximise investments and expand ecosystem management capacity. Key lessons 
learnt and recommendations made will help policymakers and conservation managers 
understand effective institutional support mechanisms that have claimed success in ‘unlocking 
and securing Ecological Infrastructure investments’. It can be concluded that impactful 
mechanisms were based on the rewards system and prioritised ecological outcomes resulting 
from the restoration and maintenance of Ecological Infrastructure. More empirical work dedicated 
to designing economic-based incentives and finance mechanisms is required as well as the 
demonstration of key successes and returns on investments in order to make the case for 
investments. 
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Chapter Three: Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES): A review of 
successes, challenges and failures, and lessons learnt for investments 
in Ecological Infrastructure. 
Abstract 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have gained global popularity as a new approach of 
using economic incentives to deliver Ecosystem Services in a sustainable manner. However, 
there has been insufficient academic literature to advise Ecological Infrastructure investment 
efforts based on lessons learnt from PES discourse. This study comprises a global Systematic 
Literature Review of peer-reviewed and grey literature to assess the successes of PES schemes, 
and failures, and challenges experienced in PES design and implementation. Sixty international 
studies were reviewed to provide insights for Ecological Infrastructure investment policy advice in 
South Africa. Results revealed a variety of strong institutional, social, ecological and least 
economic/financial successes achieved by PES. However, challenges and failures were 
experienced in different nations depending on institutional arrangements and ecological 
conditions. To establish a better understanding of more focussed lessons for Ecological 
Infrastructure investments (using PES model), this study provided policy and investment insights 
to inform the design, funding, implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation of PES 
programmes. 
Introduction 
In the past two decades, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have drawn international 
attention of academia, natural resources practitioners and conservationists as vehicles that 
promote conservation and address socio-economic challenges (Jespersen and Gallemore 2018). 
PES were introduced as an economic concept to account for negative ecosystem externalities 
(Detrimental consequences of economic activities on ecosystem) (Hausknost et al. 2017)1. PES 
are defined as voluntary or market-based approaches which ensure that those who enhance 
Ecosystem Services (ES) flows are compensated, and beneficiaries (such as users of clean 
water) of ES bear the costs (Wunder 2005; Cimon-Morin et al. 2013; Martin-Ortega et al. 2013; 
Diswandi 2017; Smith and Day 2018). Maintenance and restoration of Ecological Infrastructure 
(a natural or semi-natural functioning ecosystem which delivers services to people) exemplify a 
conservation intervention to enable ES delivery. The key philosophy of PES is to internalise 
                                                          
1 It is not my purpose to comprehensively review PES and its criticism but to briefly outline its underpinnings 
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ecosystem externalities (based on either Coasean2 or Pigouvian3 economic theorem) caused by 
anthropogenic activities and to ascribe a monetary value to ES to help decision-makers realise 
the rate of ES loss (Martin-Ortega et al. 2013; Bellver-domingo et al. 2016; Chan et al. 2017; 
Diswandi 2017; Smith and Day 2018). A stimulus for economic approaches to Ecological 
Infrastructure was achieved through the “Ecosystem Services-human wellbeing” nexus which was 
popularised by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005; Midler et al. 2015; Costanza 
et al. 2017). The ‘Ecosystem Services’ metaphor became a vital tool to elevate Ecological 
Infrastructure understanding onto policy and ecosystem-based intervention management 
measures (Hausknost et al. 2017). As a result, some governments started intervening through 
regulation, tax, subsidy or encouragement of payments to private landowners who conserve 
Ecological Infrastructure (van der Horst 2011; Diswandi 2017).  
In 1995, the government of South Africa established a ‘Working for Water’ programme to 
protect water resources while empowering previously disadvantaged citizens. Later on, the 
‘Working for Water’ programme broadened its scope and became the Natural Resources 
Management (NRM) programme to address environmental degradation caused by anthropogenic 
and natural drivers (e.g. Invasive Alien Plants ) which ultimately disrupt the supply of ES (van 
Wilgen et al. 2001; Richardson and van Wilgen 2004; Marais and Wannenburgh 2008). The NRM 
has been cited within the PES discourse because it maintains and restores Ecological 
Infrastructure whilst alleviating poverty in poor communities through the creation of employment 
opportunities (Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). NRM investments supplement traditional 
conservation tactics such as protected areas and national parks because they lack sustainable 
funding to guarantee continuous management and protection of Ecological Infrastructure (Cimon-
Morin et al. 2013). The PES approach initially gained political support in South Africa due to its 
environmental sustainability and socio-economic development emphasis (Turpie et al. 2007), 
however, its implementation has faced challenges (Blignaut and van der Elst 2014). For example, 
the PES approach failed to augment voluntary payments for water services, monitor changes in 
ES delivery and to secure investments and funds (Turpie et al. 2007). 
Despite the international adoption of PES (Carter et al. 2014; Grima et al. 2016), challenges 
and criticism have also mounted (de Lima et al. 2017; Arriagada et al. 2018). The aim of this 
chapter was to review the successes, challenges, and failures of implementation of PES as a 
                                                          
2 No government official is needed, private ‘market negotiations’ among social actors where ES beneficiary will 
compensate the ES provider. 
3 Governmental payment programmes through taxing negative or subsidising positive externalities 
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conservation mechanism in order to extract lessons learnt for Ecological Infrastructure 
investments. It is anticipated that the insights learnt will improve the understanding of factors that 
contribute to the successes of PES and other related outcomes (McElwee et al. 2014; Grima et 
al. 2016; Johnson et al. 2018; Paudyal et al. 2018); provide a clear understanding of challenges 
and difficulties experienced in the design and implementation of PES schemes (Grima et al. 2016) 
and help to understand institutional failures that hinder the PES vision (Jespersen and Gallemore 
2018).  
The following questions were asked: 
1. What are the successes of PES schemes in ensuring efficient and effective implementation?  
2. What are the challenges and difficulties experienced in PES schemes?  
3. What have been the failures of PES schemes? 
A systematic review approach was used to contribute to a better understanding of ‘unlocking and 
securing Ecological Infrastructure investments’ through comprehensive lessons learnt from PES 
policy mechanisms. Evidence-based policy advice will inform South African conservation decision 
makers and practitioners on how to expedite PES programmes as investment tools to support 
Ecological Infrastructure maintenance and restoration. The PES concept was purposely chosen 
because of its worldwide acclaimed reputation of offering a win-win governance and policy tool to 
advance a socio-economic development agenda whilst achieving Ecological Infrastructure 
restoration and maintenance goals. The PES concept is applicable in Ecological Infrastructure 
investment dialogue because financial payments and incentives stimulate ecosystem-based 
management interventions (Farley and Costanza 2010; Hein et al. 2013; Martin-Ortega et al. 
2013; Bennett et al. 2014; Rode et al. 2016).  
Methods  
Systematic Literature Review (SLR) methodology was selected to access scientific and grey 
information to achieve the aim of the study and extract lessons essential for evidence-based 
policy advice for Ecological Infrastructure investments. SLR supports decision-making processes 
based on evidence in nature conservation (Pullin and Stewart 2007). A Systematic Review 
Protocol (SRP) was designed to guide the systematic review process (Appendix 3). The SRP set 
out the strategy of acquiring the literature sources, described the study aim, keywords, questions 
of the review and described the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of sources. I created a search 
string consisting of subject and outcomes (Table 3.1) related keywords to extract relevant sources 
from literature databases (Figure 3.1). I first carried out a pilot search as a test to enhance the 
search strategy. The search string was widened to ensure a broader coverage of sources suitable 
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for inclusion (Table 3.2). The search string consisted of synonyms, Boolean logic operators and 
truncated words. Search words were modified to suit database specifications because some 
databases (e.g. ScienceDirect, Scopus) do not accept truncated words and wildcards. The search 
terms excluded Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) which are interchangeably used as PES 
(AES investment model was covered in the first data chapter). Relevant literature was sourced 
from four electronic databases and some studies were opportunistically identified through 
snowballing sampling to supplement the identification process (particularly for grey literature). 
ROSES (RepOrting standards for Systematic Evidence Syntheses) workflow was used to screen 
the identified sources by titles, abstracts, and keywords (Figure 3.1). ROSES was chosen 
because it is a pro-forma and flow diagram created specifically for Systematic Reviews in the 
conservation sector to present a level of detail and inclusion of rich guidance statements 
(Haddaway et al. 2018). Relevant studies were reviewed in their entirety. The final sources were 
imported into ATLAS.ti v8.4 for qualitative analysis. Both inductive and deductive coding methods 
were employed to capture subject information from the primary sources. The key limitation of my 
methodology is the lack of assurance of inclusivity due to different languages and full-text 
inaccessibility of some sources.  
Table 3.1. Population/Subject, Intervention, Comparisons and Outcomes search elements  
Population/Subject All countries, PES programmes in terrestrial and marine ecosystems, peer-reviewed and grey literature. 
Intervention Payments for Ecosystem Services: a conservation management intervention used to reach a win-win 
arrangement between the providers and end-users of ES by compensating ecosystem enhancers and 
charging the beneficiaries of ES. 
Comparison Over a period to track the interest and the uptake of PES mechanisms to improve conservation and 
achieve sustainability outcomes. 
Outcomes Studies measuring the successes, failures, and challenges resulted in the execution of PES programmes. 
Note: This table defines the core focus of search strategy and I used it to qualify and disqualify sources. 
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Table 3.2. Search strings used to access studies that document successes, challenges, and failures of 
Payments for Ecosystem Services from electronic databases 
Assessment of the successes of PES 
schemes for their ability to ensure 
efficient and effective environmental 
governance 
Review of challenges and difficulties of 
PES schemes in demonstrating the 
business case for investments  
Review of failures of PES schemes 
based on decisions made by 
developers  
“payment* for ecosystem* service*” OR 
“payment* for environment* service*” OR 
“payment* for ecol* service*” 
AND  
“succe*” OR 
“achiev*” OR 
“impact*” OR 
“effect*” OR 
“accomplish*” OR 
“strength*” OR 
“highlight*” OR 
“opportunit*” OR 
“benefit*” OR  
“positiv*” 
NOT  
“Agri-Environmental Schemes” 
“payment* for ecosystem* service*” OR 
“payment* for environment* service*” OR 
“payment* for ecol* service*” 
AND 
“difficult*” OR 
“challeng*” OR 
“hind*” OR 
“barrier*” OR 
“constrain*” OR 
“limit*” OR 
“threat*”  
NOT 
“Agri-Environmental Schemes” 
“payment* for ecosystem* service*” 
OR 
“payment* for environment* service*” 
OR 
“payment* for ecol* service*” 
AND 
“fail*” OR 
“risk*” OR 
“weak*” OR 
“negative*” 
NOT 
“Agri-Environmental Schemes” 
Note: Asterisks* and truncated words were used to retrieve all the different ways those keywords might appear and 
Boolean logic operators (AND/OR) were used to connect or separate the search terms. 
Results 
Despite the exponential growth of PES publications over the past decades (Corbera et al. 2015), 
this systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey literature has reviewed 60 studies out of 756 
studies screened (Figure 3.1). Regardless of fewer publications reviewed than anticipated, the 
sources yielded evidence to better understand the review questions. The selected studies were 
compared against the inclusion criteria described in the Systematic Review Protocol (Appendix 
3). I deleted 71 duplicates found across databases, and in the end, excluded 625 studies which 
did not document successes, challenges, and failures of PES as per the exclusion criteria 
articulated in the Systematic Review Protocol. This exclusion was also based on the PICO model 
(Table 3.1). Revealed successes, challenges, and failures from all the sources were sorted into 
major institutional, financial/economic, social and ecological categories (Table 3.3) and lessons 
learnt are described later in the discussion. The categories showed close linkages that provide 
an explanation that the factors cannot be easily alienated. Depending on localities, these findings 
cannot be certainly generalised because successes in certain regions could parallel challenges 
and failures in other regions. Figures with bars presented frequent words used in the PES 
literature to describe key concepts found in PES successes, challenges, and failures through the 
ATLAS.ti codes and quotations. 
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Figure 3.1. ROSES flow diagram for Systematic Reviews used for the screening process of sources from 
various databases. 
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Table 3.3. A summarised database of factors that led or contributed to successes and failures of PES and challenges associated with their design 
and implementation.  
 Institutional Financial/economic Social Ecological 
P
E
S
 s
u
c
c
e
s
s
e
s
 
 Established rapport and trust when setting preconditions for 
deliberative and iterative contracts 
 Enabled engagement of intermediary-civil society, 
government, private sectors to agree on long term contracts, 
co-benefits, and voluntary agreements  
 Improved understanding of social, political, economic and 
institutional contexts to influence socio-cultural values, local 
Ecosystem Services (ES) and ecological identities 
 Improved indigenous communities’ capacity to gather to 
address local issues  
 Public institutions, governmental laws, and property rights 
empowered local and participating communities to access 
natural resources 
 Institutional frameworks inﬂuenced role player relationships 
by enabling funding ﬂows, ﬁnancial resources distribution, 
encourage the interest and participation of beneﬁciaries 
 Improved scientific understanding of ES  
 PES provided conservation finance 
through incentive-based mechanisms 
 PES offered public finances to support 
Green Economy  
 PES supported ecotourism through 
revenue generation  
 PES provided a new source of funding 
for Ecological Infrastructure protection 
 Payments assisted to secure land titles  
 Improved human livelihoods, 
participants and their natural livelihoods 
assets 
 PES built the capacity of ES providers 
 PES reduced poverty in rural areas 
 Communicated ES awareness to 
communities and improved local 
perceptions 
 PES made investments in community-
based organisations through 
community and social projects  
 Policy incentives influenced and 
encouraged private landowners to 
participate in PES  
 PES encouraged restoration of 
Ecological Infrastructure  
 Enhanced ecosystems and increased 
the value of biodiversity  
 Combated deforestation  
 Provided Climate Change services 
such as carbon sequestration  
 Hydrological services: Reduction of 
sediment loads, improve water quality 
and quantity in the catchment.  
 PES monitored ecosystem conditions 
post PES implementation  
 PES supported ES delivery: 
provisioning, regulatory, cultural and 
support 
 Institutional Financial/economic Social Ecological 
P
E
S
 c
h
a
lle
n
g
e
s
 a
n
d
 f
a
ilu
re
s
 
 Land tenure insecurity and ownership limited long-term 
benefits and stable production of ES 
 Land-tenure uncertainty and inappropriate institutional 
arrangements  
 Lack of trust in the implementing agent  
 The commodification of ES became problematic for PES 
actors and led to unfair situations  
 Difficulties in the establishment of fair and transparent 
community-based institutions lead to failure of PES  
 Failure to offer clear mechanisms to provide institutional 
safeguards (benefits sharing rules, land rights, legal 
grievance resolutions) 
 The slow process of developing legal frameworks, pilot 
projects, and validation models 
 Weak rule of law and poor political decisions  
 Poorly defined land, property and resource rights  
 
 
 High transaction costs could make the 
PES inefficient (project design, 
distribution of funds, monitoring and 
reporting)  
 Lack of access to capital for equipment, 
cost of material, and labour for PES 
implementation 
 Too low revenues from Ecosystem 
Services because of power 
asymmetries  
 Logistical challenge: identifying 
appropriate incentives, and providing 
additional ES under limited financial 
resources  
 Exacerbated existing tensions 
associated with intensive agricultural 
production  
 Inequitable distribution of PES benefits 
and revenue  
 
 Limited quantitative and empirical data 
to assess how PES can aid in poverty 
reduction and under what conditions  
 Emphasis on PES as a poverty 
eradication mechanism could lessen 
conservation and ecosystem 
restoration ability  
 Risk of free-riders (a market failure that 
occurs when some beneficiaries take 
advantage of ES without contributing to 
payments)  
 Social challenges such as equity 
(access and inclusivity in decision 
making processes) 
 Additionality-difficulties in 
demonstrating the effectiveness of PES 
over traditional conservation and 
environmental regulations. i.e. specified 
baseline)  
 Lack of inclusivity in participation which 
creates societal conflicts over land use 
 Limited benefits to poor people in 
developing countries 
 Failure to improve local livelihoods 
 Limited demand for service users due 
to poor understanding of ES supply 
 Difficulty in ensuring conditionality 
due to poor monitoring of service 
provision (making payments on 
condition that PES interventions 
generate desired ecological benefits, 
not upfront) 
 Poor evaluation of ES delivery  
 Lack of monitoring and evaluation of 
impacts of PES schemes to protect 
ecosystems and improve livelihoods 
 No environmental and socio-
economic baselines for Monitoring 
and Evaluation of PES performance  
 Limited provision of ES  
 Discernible lack of ability to assess 
the quality and quantity ES 
enhanced, methodological issues  
 Low species population and high 
threats 
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Figure 3.2. A summary of the codes and quotations of PES successes captured via ATLAS ti. Bars 
represent frequency of mention of concepts or phrases describing PES successes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. A representation of frequency of mention of concepts and phrases used words to describe 
PES challenges. These were generated by an automated word extraction process on ATLAS ti.  
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Figure 3.4. A summary of the codes and quotations of PES captured via ATLAS ti. Blue bars represent 
frequency of mention of concepts or phrases describing PES failures. 
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Discussion 
The successes, challenges and failures arising from PES have not received sufficient academic 
attention (Duong and de Groot 2018), while a large body of scientific literature tends to focus on 
ideal PES models (Jespersen and Gallemore 2018). This did not come as a huge surprise in the 
systematic review of PES studies because the following authors reviewed no more than 50 
studies: Bremer et al. (2018) systematically reviewed 50 studies; Blundo-Canto et al. (2018) 
systematically reviewed 46 studies; Jespersen and Gallemore (2018) systematically reviewed 44 
studies; and Corbera et al. (2015) systematically reviewed 34 studies. The dearth of 
comprehensive studies on effectiveness of PES could be regarded as a significant blind spot in 
the literature of Ecological Infrastructure investments as a whole (Jespersen and Gallemore 
2018). Sufficient literature is essential to understand the role of PES as an investment tool to 
support conservation interventions through development of more robust policy mechanisms 
(Jespersen and Gallemore 2018; Jones et al. 2019). 
PES programmes were commonly designed to achieve both livelihood upliftment and 
conservation outcomes. Their successes were subject to institutional frameworks, policies, socio-
economic and ecological outcomes and cooperative partnerships between private and public 
institutions. Institutional frameworks stimulated role-players to participate and access various 
benefits resulting from PES programmes (Pham et al. 2015; Grima et al. 2016). PES are capable 
of generating funding for conservation agencies, initiatives, ecotourism, and green economy, 
therefore it is feasible to secure long-term finance through PES (To and Dressler 2019). However, 
PES funding mechanisms may not be considered as an entire replacement of traditional funding 
mechanisms offered by national or state programmes (Schirpke et al. 2018). They are 
supplementary funding instruments intended to provide localised socio-ecological and economic 
co-benefits that improve community livelihoods while enhancing the ecological landscape. PES 
have succeeded in improving indigenous communities and rural groups by providing socio-
economic contributions such as human capacity development to manage local Community-Based 
Organizations (CBO) (Carter et al. 2014). Community empowerment to manage natural resources 
and Ecological Infrastructure is important in developing countries where conservation is 
anticipated to address both social and ecological vulnerabilities (McElwee et al. 2014).  
Ecological successes revealed that PES programmes enhance Ecological Infrastructure 
and ecosystem conditions. For example, reforestation interventions to tackle Climate Change 
were shared by the global community as a good example of carbon sequestration ES. Another 
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example was the improvement of hydrological services in catchments to mitigate water scarcity, 
where water quality and quantity were augmented. PES strengthened water security efforts under 
the detrimental conditions of degraded Ecological Infrastructure and Climate Change. The 
successes of PES as a Market-Based Conservation Instrument (MBCI) provide relevant and 
valuable lessons for a South African Ecological Infrastructure investment desire to accrue 
conservation management and socio-economic funding. PES success relies on and requires a 
commitment of long-term funds, therefore timeframes and operating projects linked to PES should 
be in the region of 10-30 years (Martin-Ortega et al. 2013). 
Despite the successful implementation of PES, challenges were also encountered in 
various countries across the world. Land tenure insecurity and high transaction costs remain the 
most challenging institutional barriers in PES design and implementation (Johnson et al. 2018), 
and these barriers are of particular concern in a South African context where issues of land reform 
(rightly or wrongly) and financial constraints are prevalent (Turpie 2004). Land ownership is 
currently viewed as a contentious political issue and the ownership insecurity could threaten the 
possibilities and willingness of private landowners to invest in Ecological Infrastructure restoration 
and maintenance on the private properties. Ideally, the South African government ought to 
facilitate trust building sessions through public engagement in order to address land tenure 
regimes in both rural and urban landscapes (Johnson et al. 2018). Some studies have shown that 
land ownership and institutional arrangements hinder effective implementation of PES 
programmes in developing countries (Clements et al. 2010; Johnson et al. 2018). 
These challenges discourage participant involvement and contribution to the functioning 
of PES programmes. The aforementioned challenges generally emanate from the closed and 
opaque establishment of Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) or agencies entrusted with the 
PES design and implementation. Exclusion of relevant role players and potential stakeholders 
incites social conflicts and detrimentally impacts the PES design. Poorly designed PES 
programmes translate into dysfunctional operations which are full of logistical and administrative 
discrepancies, such as a dearth of monitoring and evaluation of ES delivered and livelihoods 
enhanced (Borner et al, 2017). PES further become susceptible to the risk of free-riders and the 
demonstration of a business case for Ecological Infrastructure investments fails as a result of poor 
design (Lau 2013; Bennett et al. 2014). Conservation agencies or countries intending to establish 
PES programmes ought to be inclusive and open to interested and affected stakeholders. The 
benefit of inclusivity is to capitalise on diverse knowledge and capacity brought by different role 
players into preparation for unforeseen technical, administrative and functionality challenges. 
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Failing to engage the public leads to poor clarification of benefit sharing rules, persistent poverty 
in developing countries and social challenges and conflicts at ground level (Kumar et al. 2014). 
PES design and operation received criticism for various failures and problems worldwide. Failing 
to formulate clear and appropriate institutional frameworks weakens the reputation of PES. A 
common noticeable failure is conditionality criteria, for example PES that lack a Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) framework and baseline indicators to measure and assess benefits derived 
from conservation management interventions. In the absence of baseline indicators, payments 
are made in advance in good faith that anticipated Ecosystem Services will be delivered, and this 
is a risk to these projects. Setting-up PES programmes require significant budgets and failing to 
demonstrate positive impact may lead to complete failure (Sommerville et al. 2011). 
Policy implications and lessons for Ecological Infrastructure 
investments 
To inform Natural Resources Management practitioners, policymakers and other key 
stakeholders in the Ecosystem Services fraternity, below are lessons and insights to consider 
when designing, implementing and evaluating PES with better chances of success. 
Design 
 PES programmes ought to be designed through an inclusive and consultative process to 
enable transparent and participatory decision-making processes. Community members and 
stakeholders are envisaged to set up regulations, decide how to manage PES payments and 
budgets, resolve internal issues and address social equity (Hayes and Murtinho 2018; 
Paudyal et al. 2018). 
 When designing the PES, practitioners ought to invest time and seek to understand 
complications, complexities and identify institutional barriers (administrative, political and 
legal) to be experienced during execution. The foreseeable barriers are land tenure 
arrangements, transaction costs, payment structure and government policy including social, 
ecological, financial or economic and institutional arrangements (Reed et al. 2014; de Lima et 
al. 2017; Hayes and Murtinho 2018; Paudyal et al. 2018).  
Funding  
 Operating PES requires substantial financial resources. Funds could be sourced from both 
private and public sector institutions. Public funding can be raised through the following legal 
instruments: penalties, taxes, bank loans, biodiversity offset and environmental funds. Private 
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funding can be secured through Non-Governmental Organisations, Non-Profit Organisations, 
charities, foundations, local or international private investments and businesses (Sattler et al. 
2013; Jones et al. 2019). 
 Development of alternative and additional funding streams is essential as well as stimulation 
of voluntary participation (Hein et al. 2013; Liu and Kontoleon 2018). 
Implementation and, Monitoring and Evaluation 
 Clear Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) frameworks must identify and explain the indicators 
to be used. For example, assessment of species, threats, trends or differences made by 
conservation interventions and how they will be monitored. The M&E exercise can absorb a 
substantial amount of PES budget (9-19%), therefore dedicated funding to evaluate is 
essential to build evidence and make a business case for investments (Sommerville et al. 
2011; Pham et al. 2015). 
 A functional monitoring system helps implementers and partners to communicate the results 
to the funders and attract new potential investors/funders while supporting the growth of 
conservation interventions (de Lima et al. 2017). 
 Uncertainties (institutional, social, economic/financial and ecological) must be explicitly 
addressed to understand the potential measures to progress, cope and adapt to unexpected 
events and guarantee long term viability of PES schemes. (Consideration of possible 
uncertainties due to political interests is crucial).  
 
NRM as a PES: implication for policy advice 
The South African NRM programme is regarded as a PES because Ecological Infrastructure 
functions and biodiversity of catchments are targeted. The NRM programme does not fully reward 
private landowners for Ecological Infrastructure maintenance and restoration, however, it employs 
locals to clear invasive alien vegetation, and to restore fire regimes in both public and private 
ecological landscape through government investments. The NRM is not regarded as an economic 
mechanism to internalise externalities by commodifying Ecosystem Services; in this case 
government pays for conservation interventions to deliver ES (Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). 
The following countries have utilised PES policy mechanisms and financial incentives 
programmes: 
The Chinese government subsidises private landowners for retiring the land and restoring 
degraded landscape. This programme improves the natural environment and alleviates poverty 
(Liu et al. 2019). 
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The United States use a Land Retirement approach through agri-environmental policy which 
offers monetary compensation for a period of time ranging from 10-15 years to improve soil, 
wildlife, air and water quantity and quality and other conservation interventions (Liu et al. 2019). 
In Europe-the PES mechanism internalises negative ecosystem externalities. Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) requires EU state members to offer payments to private landowners 
who voluntarily implement conservation management interventions to enhance ecological 
landscapes (de Krom 2017; Nielsen et al. 2018). However, this approach has sparked a 
discussion on whether payments are offered based on ecological outcomes or based on actions 
implemented? (Arnott et al. 2019). 
In Costa Rica-the PES was founded in 1996 based on a political support system. It intends to 
deliver these services: biodiversity conservation, augmentation of water services, aesthetic 
beauty of nature and mitigation of greenhouse gases (Fletcher and Breitling 2012). Private 
landowners are rewarded for reforestation or conserving the forest with the intention of integrating 
conservation considerations in natural landscapes that fall outside protected areas  
(Pagiola 2006). 
In Mexico-the PES was established in 2003 to halt over-utilisation of aquifers. The PES is 
financed through compulsory water taxes. Private landowners are incentivised for conserving 
forest ecosystems (Corbera et al. 2008; Russi et al. 2016).  
The vast majority of PES programmes (China, Mexico, Costa Rica and the Agri-Environmental 
Schemes in Europe and the United States) are driven by states under national policy frameworks. 
Funds are accumulated through taxes and the level of payments are politically regulated and 
established (Gómez-baggethun and Muradian 2015). To date, 90% of PES funds come from 
governments and 99% of PES programmes focus on public goods (Gómez-baggethun and 
Muradian 2015; Vatn 2018). Institutional and policy frameworks, incentives and economic-based 
instruments are considered as effective and efficient PES financing mechanisms (Sumaila et al. 
2017). Optimising synergies across sectoral policies is a major resource mobilisation approach to 
help identify co-funding possibilities and secure funding to support PES (Sumaila et al. 2017). To 
contribute to the PES funding in low-income and middle countries, these funding mechanisms are 
recommended (1) ecotourism levies through visitors’ contribution in protected areas (2) water 
taxes for hydrological services (3) compensation of developing countries for conserving forests 
and sequestering carbon through the Reduced Emissions from Degradation and Deforestation 
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(REDD) mechanism (4) green commodities trading where private businesses indicate that their 
products and processes hold green standards regarding the environment, health and social 
component (Vatn 2018) and (5) biodiversity markets where conservation funds or conservation 
banking schemes sell biodiversity credits and utilise biodiversity offset funds (compensatory 
mechanism for loss of biodiversity due to developmental activity) (Hein et al. 2013; Vatn 2018). 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study advance the knowledge of institutional, social, economic/financial and 
ecological factors that affect the design and implementation of PES based on synthesised 
successes, challenges, and failures of PES programmes. Successes and failures vary in different 
countries, and what succeeded in one country could result in failure in another country, depending 
on institutional, social, economic/financial arrangements and ecological conditions. Despite this, 
acquiring a global understanding of documented successes, challenges and failures of PES 
programmes helps decision and policy-makers, managing authorities and practitioners learn 
appropriate PES design and policy frameworks based on practices and experiences. Well-
designed PES programmes effectively deliver Ecosystem Services and socio-economic benefits 
whilst poorly designed ones could result in wasteful expenditure and sources of conflict (Borner 
et al. 2017). To support PES design, guidelines and principles must be developed to address the 
highlighted institutional, social, economic/financial and ecological challenges and failures. The 
following features could lessen undesired failures and maximise possibilities of successes: (1) a 
participatory and inclusive design and implementation of PES which cautiously considers why 
and how stakeholders and partners participate to ensure equity (2) an application of an integrated 
monitoring and evaluation system is vital to understand key social, economic and ecological 
effects and benefits of PES, (3) even though PES are a funding mechanism for biodiversity 
conservation, they may not be anticipated to fill the gap between funds generated and funds 
required (Hein et al. 2013), it is essential to devise funding strategies to ensure PES sustainability.  
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Recommendations  
This chapter presents a concluding narrative and qualitative synthesis of the systematic literature 
review and further recommends measures to scale up Ecological Infrastructure investments 
through policy advice. 
The thesis aimed to improve the understanding of ‘unlocking and securing Ecological 
Infrastructure investments’ by reviewing viable investment mechanisms applied in other countries. 
Acquiring a better understanding of investments in EI supports the long-term plans to establish 
Ecological Infrastructure investment and funding pipelines to close the current funding gap in 
DEFF Natural Resources Management and conservation sector in South Africa as a whole. 
Systematic Literature Review research methodology was employed to ensure rigour, objective, 
transparent review (Collaboration for Environmental Evidence 2013) and to produce 
comprehensive and reproducible reviews of evidence and lessons (Bilotta et al. 2014). Relevant 
lessons, evidence, and insights from Ecological Infrastructure investment and financing models 
(AES, PES) were presented to guide and inform natural resources managers, policy and decision-
makers who seek to maintain and restore Ecological Infrastructure for the benefit of reducing 
ecological degradation, meeting sustainability goals and curbing business risk through policy 
development. 
The study results showed different (but related) developmental and conservation drivers that 
stimulate the need to invest in Ecological Infrastructure. These needs were both natural and 
anthropogenic in nature. They included Climate Change; Water management; Biodiversity 
protection and Ecosystem Services; Mitigation of agricultural impacts and Agronomic 
development. Conserving and maintaining Ecological Infrastructure is essential to ensure both 
ecological and socio-economic benefits. These benefits include both Ecosystem Services delivery 
and improvement of livelihoods. It is crucial to engage and involve private landowners, 
government authorities, business sector, potential investors and various disciplines (e.g. political 
leaders, financial institutions, built engineering sector etc.) when seeking investments through 
partnerships. 
The investment capacity and willingness of private landowners to participate in EI maintenance 
and restoration is influenced and shaped by incentives and compensatory measures. Socio-
economic characteristics and distinctive environmental features further stimulate landowner 
interest to maintain and restore Ecological Infrastructure. Therefore, rewarding economic returns 
and conservation benefits prompt investment interest. However, maximising private investments 
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to support EI conservation and management measures remains a priority. Intensified efforts to 
promote conservation awareness and EI importance are beneficial to stimulate investment 
willingness and dedicated efforts to EI restoration and maintenance (García-Llorente et al. 2011). 
Policy regime and institutional support mechanisms  
Different policy tools and institutional support mechanisms have become instrumental when 
encouraging private landowners and stakeholders to collaborate and explore investments to 
support Ecological Infrastructure conservation programmes. In European countries, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) was formulated to provide Ecosystem Services from farmlands and 
forestry sectors while optimising environmental sustainability. The CAP required all member 
states, in conjunction with private landowners to implement Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) 
to counteract biodiversity and ecosystem degradation (Russi et al. 2016; Zimmermann and Britz 
2016; de Krom 2017). This case exemplifies the use of policy and cooperation support 
mechanisms to initiate partnership amongst stakeholders to address Ecological Infrastructure 
conservation needs. Lessons learnt from the AES model showed that the programme generates 
substantial investments, improves Ecological Infrastructure condition and utilises incentives to 
encourage private landowner participation. However, AES have not used evidence of ecological 
outcomes to reward participants. Latest insights suggest that AES should make payments to 
farmers based on the positive ecological impacts generated, not merely compliance with set rules 
and actions made (Russi et al. 2016). This approach requires clear monitoring and evaluation 
methods to prove the effectiveness of conservation interventions (Chapter 2). 
Public policies and cooperation  
Public policies were effective and impactful mechanisms to ensure positive net conservation 
benefits. These regulatory measures ensured that private landowners and business sector adopt 
sensible means to manage Ecological Infrastructure. Policies further required institutions to 
improve ecological conditions on their sites, particularly when their practices degraded or reduced 
Ecological Infrastructure quality. Policy tools also created a link between conservation 
organisations and corporate players to support conservation management interventions, through 
investments. ‘Unlocking and securing Ecological Infrastructure investments’ require improved 
collaboration between finance and conservation sector. This approach requires facilitated 
dialogue and investment planning across conservation related institutions (Chapter 2).  
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Market-Based Conservation Instruments 
The South African NRM programme was established to provide seed funding for Ecological 
Infrastructure maintenance and restoration across the country. Application of economic-based 
policy mechanisms that use incentives and compensation for Ecosystem Services supply are 
gaining traction globally more than ‘command and control regulations’ that impose directives 
(Davis and Gartside 2001; Gómez-baggethun and Muradian 2015; Mills et al. 2018). Incentives 
and compensation should be provided by public and private organisations to implementers of 
ecological restoration and maintanance based on ecological outcomes delivered (Chapter 2). 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
PES programmes are globally becoming eye-catching mechanisms to address negative 
ecosystem externalities due to resource extraction whilst aiming to enhance social and economic 
conditions (Kolinjivadi et al. 2014). PES programmes promoted ecological restoration and 
ecosystem services delivery, whilst they have attempted to alleviate poverty in developing 
countries (Carter et al. 2014). PES have made better progress in delivering ES, alleviating poverty 
through meaningful economic contributions and generating revenue for Ecological Infrastructure 
protection. However, there were challenges and failures that hindered their success such as high 
transaction costs, weak institutions, poor management capacity, and land insecurity (Chapter 3). 
Practical measures to improve their performance are summarised in Table 4.1. The review of 
PES successes, failures and challenges revealed valuable insights and lessons for South African 
Ecological Infrastructure investment journey and possibly for other institutions who seek to employ 
a PES as an Ecological Infrastructure Investment tool. 
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Table 4.1. Summary of significant lessons learnt from the Systematic Literature Reviews of both research chapters. 
Ecological Infrastructure investment lessons learnt from chapter 
two 
Ecological Infrastructure investment lessons learnt from chapter three  
Government is generally anticipated to play a leading role in coordinating 
Ecological Infrastructure investments through policy development and 
political support. 
Agri-Environment Scheme  
Agri-Environmental Schemes are beginning to offer financial rewards 
based on the ecological outcomes delivered (enhancement and 
conservation of Ecological Infrastructure), rather than conservation 
management interventions. The success of this investment approach 
relies on the definition of key indicators to determine anticipated results 
(Schroeder et al. 2013; de Krom 2017)  
Public-Private Partnership  
Public-Private Partnerships help to raise and mobilise funding from 
multiple sources for conservation and maintenance of Ecological 
Infrastructure (Glumac et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2018). 
Public Policy and Market-Based Conservation Instruments 
The public policy requires that the government offer incentives to private 
landowners who protect Ecological Infrastructure and supply Ecosystem 
Services (Duke et al. 2013). Government ought to pay closer attention to 
incentivisation and compensation because contemporary policy-making 
strategies are shifting away from traditional command and control 
measures which enforce directives for non-compliance to laws and 
policies that encourage private landowners to contribute to maintenance 
and conservation of Ecological Infrastructure. The South African 
government should develop ecological compensation and incentivisation 
policies (Davis and Gartside 2001). 
The above recommendations would be achievable through effective 
collaboration amongst government bodies, non-governmental agencies, 
corporate and private sectors and private landowners (Franks and Emery 
2013).  
These lessons and insights are essential for the design, implementation, and evaluation of PES. However, there 
is no one-size-ﬁts-all arrangement for the success of PES programmes, but specific thoughts are necessary to be 
considered for effectiveness in PES implementation.  
Design 
PES designers and affected parties should gather through a consultative arrangement to unpack and 
understand regulations governing PES, payments, discuss possible internal conflicts, budget and other related 
matters (Paudyal et al. 2018). Recognise and address administrative and organisational needs. Communities 
should be supported to manage PES in a manner that enables the flow of anticipated results (Hayes and 
Murtinho 2018). Furthermore, there must be a grievance mechanism to promote accountability and transparency 
in the revenue sharing amongst the locals (Sommerville et al. 2011) and PES programmes should be designed 
in a manner which maximises social, economic and ecological benefits. 
Implementation  
There is no one-size-fits-all approach for efficient implementation of PES (Kemkes et al. 2010). However, the 
implementation of PES requires locally developed efficient and transparent management systems to enable a fair 
distribution of community benefits amongst participating communities (Reed et al. 2014). It is ought to be based 
on these key elements: (i) collection and utilisation of baseline data to provide evidence of effectiveness delivery 
of ecosystem services (ii) cognisance of dynamic nature of ecosystems and (iii) inclusion of risk metrics such as 
climate change and invasive species (Borner et al. 2017).  
Monitoring and Evaluation 
PES programmes must have a framework to monitor and evaluate conservation and ecosystem services delivery. 
Indicators must be developed (i.e. positive results, threats, species, etc.), a plan to monitor, (i.e. using remote-
sensed or ground-based data to track changes over time) and how the information will be used to inform payments 
and secure buy-in from potential investors (Sommerville et al. 2011).  
Funding 
PES are vital to generate new funding for Ecological Infrastructure and they have a potential to lead to long-term 
funding, however, they cannot be anticipated to substitute traditional funding mechanisms (Hein et al. 2013). 
Funds to support PES can be sourced from private and public institutions. These measures can be used to solicit 
public funds, public budget, environmental taxes, fines and businesses, Non-Governmental Organisations can 
also inject funds to support PES programmes (Sattler et al. 2013). 
Note: The aim of the review is to inform policy and decision makers and NRM practitioners about Ecological Infrastructure investment 
models, both AES and PES. These are considered as recommendations and measures to be executed in attempts to grow investments 
and develop financial mechanisms through government and private sector support. 
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Conclusion 
Investments in Ecological Infrastructure require collaborative and multidisciplinary approaches 
across organisational boundaries where different state and private organs contribute financial 
resources and intellectual capacity. The systematic literature reviews presented in this thesis 
demonstrated how market-based conservation mechanisms have been used to promote 
Ecological Infrastructure investments elsewhere. Private landowners and business sector 
involvement would play an integral role in making investment instruments function effectively. I 
recommend development of an Ecological Infrastructure investments policy based on lessons 
and insights I have presented from Public-Private Partnerships, Agri-Environmental Schemes, 
Public Policies, Market-Based Conservation Instruments and Payments for Ecosystem Services. 
Additionally, this research contributes to the policy design literature by highlighting the drivers and 
needs for Ecological Infrastructure investments as well as the factors that stimulate private 
landowner willingness to invest in Ecological Infrastructure. This understanding helps to 
coordinate collaborative efforts and collective responsibility to share funding burden between 
private and public institutions. Most of the solutions described above need government and 
private sector attention because government is meant to create a conducive environment for 
investments. A framework to generate investment pipeline should be developed. There is also a 
need to review and explore more investment models as well as other specific policy tools which 
support finance and funding investments. 
Implications for future research  
Grey areas warranting further research were also identified. Further research should scrutinise 
funding and finance mechanisms to help build an Ecological Infrastructure investment framework 
for South Africa. Furthermore, there is a need to broaden the understanding of funding tools such 
as Conservation Funds (biodiversity banks and Green Bonds) and long-term public and private 
partnerships. Improved understanding will help policymakers and decision-makers to understand 
how to design economic-based policies that support and promote collaborative management. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Systematic Review Protocol (SRP) define the objectives of the review, review questions, 
criteria for inclusion and exclusion of sources and keywords.  
 
iA protocol for a systematic literature review 
Research question 
How to unlock and secure Ecological Infrastructure (EI) investments through policy framework and 
partnerships with private landowners?  
Eligibility criteria 
Peer-reviewed journals and grey literature reports written on partnerships investments made to support 
Ecological Infrastructure maintenance and restoration. Sources covering one of the key aspects (1) 
developmental need for EI investments (2) desire from private landowners to cooperate (3) Policy support 
to encourage EI protection cooperation. 
Search strategy 
Key concepts: 
1. Ecological infrastructure 
2. Investments 
3. Policy framework 
PICO model 
Over search strategy models/tools available (e.g. SPICE, ECLIPSE, SPIDER), a PICO model 
(Population/problem, Interventions, Comparison, Outcomes) was chosen to break down the search words 
and enable the researcher to define the qualitative research question and lay the pathway for a 
systematic search strategy (Pullin and Stewart 2007). 
 
 
 
Sources 
Science Direct, Scopus, Web of Science and Google search engine. 
Searching other resources: Snowballing will be conducted to add more studies, relevant reviews, reports, 
and other grey literature for relevant references.    
Validity 
Include the sources that document collaborative partnerships towards EI maintenance and restoration. 
Exclude non-English papers. No restriction on publication year due to the newness of the EI concept.  
Data extraction and management 
A customised PRISMA workflow will be used to screen studies. This process will review the titles, 
abstracts, and keywords. Irrelevant studies will be excluded after reading the titles and abstracts and on 
indication that they do not meet the inclusion criteria described above. Relevant articles will proceed to 
the full review.  
Data analysis 
Mix coding approach will be conducted deductively and inductively, the former approach will code (1) 
developmental needs of EI investments, (2) desires to invest and (3) policy support mechanisms. The 
latter will extract ideas found in order to generate the emerging theory from the literature. Atlas.ti will be 
used for qualitative analysis.  
PICO model 
Population/Subject Intervention/action Comparison Outcome 
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Appendix 2. A summary of literature sources chosen for the review from different databases. 
Literature source    Number of papers 
Land Use Policy    74 
Ecological Economics    44 
Ecosystem Services    15 
Environmental Management    4 
Biological Conservation    4 
Forest Policy and Economics       3 
Environmental Science and Policy  3 
Agriculture, Ecosystem and Environment  3 
Landscape and Urban Planning   2 
Environmental Sustainability    2 
Cleaner Production    2 
Water Resources and Economics  1 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamic 1 
Science of the Total Environment   1 
Ocean and Coastal Management   1 
GeoForum     1 
Ecology and Conservation    1 
Disaster Risk and Reduction   1 
Agricultural and Resource Economics  1 
 
Grey literature 
Encyclopedia of Agriculture and Food System  1 
NatureVest: Natural Capital Investment Solution 1 
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Appendix 3. Systematic Review Protocol of Payments for Ecosystem Services 
A protocol for a systematic review 
Research question 
What elements optimised, complicated and hindered the execution of Payments for Ecosystems Services 
(PES) schemes towards conservation outcomes and ecological integrity? 
Eligibility criteria 
Peer-reviewed journals and reports written on Payments for Ecosystem Services particularly the 
successes, challenges, and failures.  
Search strategy 
Key concepts: 
Payments for Ecosystem Services successes 
Payment for Ecosystem Service challenges 
Payment for Ecosystem Services failures 
PICO model 
Over search strategy models/tools available (e.g. SPICE, ECLIPSE, SPIDER), a PICO model 
(Population/problem, Interventions, Comparison, Outcomes) was chosen to ‘break down the search 
words and enable the researchers to define the qualitative research question and lay the pathway for a 
systematic search strategy (Pullin and Stewart 2007)’. 
 
 
 
  
Keywords 
Assessment of the successes of PES 
schemes for their ability to ensure efficient 
and effective environmental governance 
Review of multiple challenges and 
difficulties of PES schemes in 
demonstrating the business case for 
investments  
Review of failures of PES 
schemes based on decisions 
made by developers  
“payment* for ecosystem* service*” OR 
“payment* for environment* service*” OR 
“payment* for ecol* service*” 
AND  
“succe*” OR 
“achiev*” OR 
“impact*” OR 
“effect*” OR 
“accomplish*” OR 
“strength*” OR 
“highlight*” OR 
“opportunit*” OR 
“benefit*” OR  
“positiv*” 
“payment* for ecosystem* service*” OR 
“payment* for environment* service*” 
OR 
“payment* for ecol*service*” 
AND  
“difficult*” OR 
“challeng*” OR 
“hind*” OR 
“barrier*” OR 
“constrain*” OR 
“limit*” OR 
“threat*”  
“payment* for ecosystem* 
service*” OR 
“payment* for environment* 
service*” OR 
“payment* for ecol*service*” 
AND 
“fail*” OR 
“risk*” OR 
“weak*” OR 
“negative*” 
 
 
PICO model 
Population/Subject Intervention/action Comparison Outcome 
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Sources 
Science Direct, Scopus, Web of Science and Google search engine. 
Searching other resources: Snowballing was conducted to add more studies, relevant reviews, reports, 
and other grey literature for relevant references.    
Validity 
Include Payments for Ecosystem Services studies as a conservation mechanism. Exclude non-English 
papers.  
Data extraction and management 
A customised ROSES workflow was used to screen studies. Article titles, abstracts, and keywords were 
reviewed. Irrelevant studies were excluded based on the eligibility criteria described above. Relevant 
articles were read in full.  
Data analysis 
Mix coding approach was conducted deductively and inductively, the former approach coded the (1) 
successes (2) failures and (3) challenges of PES schemes. The latter was open to ideas found in order to 
generate the new emerging theory from the literature. Atlas.ti was used for qualitative analysis.  
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Appendix 4. Details of analysed sources that answered most of the questions asked in chapter 2. This database was used in the qualitative 
systematic literature review in order to synthesise the Ecological Infrastructure investment needs, willingness to invest and institutional support 
mechanisms at a global scale. 
Author(s)  Year Location PICO Study type Ecological Infrastructure 
investment needs or drivers 
Ecological Infrastructure investment desire, 
willingness, contribution and capacity (public 
and private landowners) 
Policy dimension and other supporting 
institutional mechanisms 
Davis & 
Gartside 
2001 
2001 Australia Intervention  Survey  Curb the overexploitation and 
destruction of important marine 
assets in industries such as 
fishing and tourism. 
Not defined Economic instruments for managing marine natural 
resources and financial incentives. Unlike the 
traditional approach to managing natural resource 
problems, (apply regulations, ‘command-and-
control’ approach where government measures 
(legislation) with which individuals or corporate 
entities must comply. 
Verbi & 
Slabeerker 
2008  
2008 Slovenia Willingness Analysis  Not defined  Determinants of willingness-to-pay include the 
respondent's income, the frequency of visiting the 
environmental goods, attitude to environmental 
goods. 
Not defined 
Yang et al. 
2010 
2010 Australia  Outcomes Survey  Not defined The innovative use of market-based approaches to 
government investment in conservation has made 
substantial advances towards improved cost-
effectiveness  
Government investment programs; agricultural 
stewardship schemes and payments for ecosystem 
services aim to motivate conservation actions on 
private land to generate substantial public benefits, 
often occurring off-farm or downstream.  
Primdahl et 
al. 2010 
2010 UK Policy Reviews Paying directly for a clean and 
diverse environment. 
Not defined Agri-environment schemes are designed to 
address protection, maintenance, and 
enhancement of natural resources (water and soil), 
biodiversity (species and habitats) and landscape 
values. 
Moon & 
Cocklin 2011 
2011 Australia Comparator Perspective  Not defined Landholders’ decisions to participate depended on 
the level of formal biodiversity protection, potential 
changes to their property rights, personal benefits 
of participation, conservation, production, financial 
and experimental imperatives.  
Market-based economic instruments should be 
used, when there is a commitment to conservation 
by the landholders and program administrators and 
sufficient funding. Voluntary and economic policy 
instruments can be used to stimulate participation 
and to reduce the creation of perverse ecological 
outcomes. 
Schroeder et 
al. 2013 
2013 England Outcomes Perspective Lessen biodiversity 
deterioration, soil erosion, 
greenhouse gases and project 
water quality due to Agri-
intensification. 
Willingness was influenced by demographic, 
business and environmental features. (Age, 
education, size and type of a business/farm 
ownership). 
The government financially supported 
Environmental Conservation through Agri-
Environmental Schemes-a results and efficiency-
driven approach.  
Duke et al. 
2013 
2013 US Intervention Review  To enhance Social Benefits to 
deliver enough ecosystem 
services 
Not defined Conservation policy was used to incentivise 
landowners to protect endangered species habitat, 
control erosion, improve water quality enhance 
riparian buffers, and expand wetlands.  
Franks & 
Emery 2013 
2013 England Intervention Perspective Not defined Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) ESS was used to improve collaboration between 
local authorities, communities, statutory agencies, 
the voluntary and private sectors, farmers, land 
managers, and individual citizens to create 
Ecological Restoration Zones. 
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Zammit 2013 2013 Australia Intervention 
and Subject 
Empirical  To restore and maintain 
endangered ecological 
communities  
Incentives for private landowners to engage in 
active biodiversity conservation measures through 
cost-effective investments of public funds and build 
capacity to be effective conservation managers. 
The Forest Conservation Fund and the 
Environmental Stewardship Program were funded 
by the government to target endangered ecological 
communities and secured contracts, landowners, to 
improve habitat condition. 
Pettersson & 
Keskitalo 
2013 
2013 EU/UK Intervention  Policy 
analysis 
and review 
Protection of biodiversity in 
general due to climate change, 
and a desire to halt biodiversity 
losses. 
Not defined  Rules, regulations, substantive provisions that 
restrict access to, or prohibit the use of designated 
habitats and control activities. 
Lapeyre et 
al. 2015 
2015 France  Policy Analysis Protect and deliver Ecosystem 
Services. 
Farmers were encouraged to protected and 
generate Ecosystem Services through Market-
Based Conservation Instruments (MBCIs). 
Compensatory mitigation, biodiversity offsets, 
mitigation banking, habitat banking, species 
banking, wetlands mitigation, are Market-Based 
Conservation Instruments (MBCIs) for ecosystem 
services and compensation for damages from 
development. 
Froger et al. 
2015 
2015 France Comparison Analysis 
and 
comparison  
To restore and protect 
wetlands, species, habitats, 
ecosystem services or 
functions. 
Not defined  Biodiversity “banks” have been developed to 
provide biodiversity units or credits to offset 
environmental damage caused by economic 
development. 
Yeboah et al. 
2015 
2015 USA Willingness Empirical  Mitigate non-point source 
(NPS) pollution in a catchment 
Willingness to participate in Agri-environmental 
programs was positively related to farm size, 
educational attainment, farmer’s interest and/or 
experience with conservation, environmental 
attitudes, access to and quality of information, 
perceived financial and farm-level related benefits. 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) were 
introduced by the government to encourage best 
management practices (BMPs) adoption for 
catchment protection and to control of NPS 
pollution and agricultural runoff. 
Glumac et al. 
2015 
2015 Netherla
nds  
 
Intervention   
Empirical Limitations to public funding Not defined Public-private partnerships have led to 
governments to invite the private sector into 
various long-term arrangements for capital-
intensive projects.  
Bremer et al. 
2016 
2016 Latin 
America 
Intervention 
and 
Outcomes 
Empirical  To promote long-term 
catchment conservation with 
multiple benefits for 
biodiversity and human well-
being. 
A legal mechanism catalysed participation. Public funding secured through legislation provided 
the most funding, private sector, NGO, and 
development bank sources also supported 
Russi et al. 
2016 
2016 Germany Policy Perspective  Not defined  Farmers were motivated to join the scheme by the 
monetary incentives and ethical reasons. 
Result-based Agri-environment measures to 
stimulate and improve the conditionality and 
efficiency of the use of CAP funding for 
environmental land management. They differ from 
action-based measures.  
Mcwilliam & 
Balzarova 
2017 
2017 New 
Zealand 
Intervention Empirical  Alleviate farming 
environmental impacts on 
terrestrial and freshwater 
ecosystems. 
Farmers developed EI conservation policies with 
support from government-due to NGOs and public 
concerns. 
The government encouraged the best farming 
practice through regulatory enforcement.  
Galbraith et 
al. 2017 
2017 Costa 
Rica 
Intervention Perspective Land Use and Cover (LUC) 
change is a major driver of 
ecosystem services loss 
worldwide. 
Not defined Policy- makers had designed conservation 
strategies that incentivised maintenance of LUC, 
ecosystem services provision and poverty 
reduction. 
Krom 2017 2017 Belgium Intervention
s  
Perspective Sustainably integrate 
environmental production in 
Farmers participated in the Agri-environmental 
schemes to enhance the long-term viability of their 
Farmers were incentivised for conserving and 
enhancing the environment through Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP)  
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agricultural business 
development.  
agricultural businesses through cooperative and, 
bridging social ties with other stakeholders. 
Weikard et 
al. 2017 
2017 Hungary Intervention 
and 
Outcomes 
Perspective 
Theoretical  
Analysis 
Mitigate flooding risk due to 
Climate Change  
Farmers’ willingness to have their lands included in 
a conservation programme depended on the 
compensation they will obtain. 
A proposed new compensation scheme consisted 
of an unconditional annual payment and a 
reparation payment conditional on flooding.  
Piffer Salles 
et al. 2017 
2017 Brazil Policy Analysis  To generate Ecosystem 
Services (ES) to meet human 
needs, reduce carbon 
emissions and maintain 
biodiversity. 
The willingness was driven by the use of Incentive-
based economic instruments. 
Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) was used to provide 
economic incentives for the adoption of forest-
based mitigation measures against global climate 
change. 
Harrington & 
Hsu 2018 
2018 US Intervention  Empirical Address storm-water 
management challenges 
Government and non-profit organizations 
collaborated to provide the funding to experiment 
green infrastructure technologies. 
The government led green infrastructure through 
policy and political support and NGOs provided 
information 
Feng et al. 
2018 
2018 China Intervention  Empirical  To protect catchment 
ecosystem services 
Compensation was used to motivate local farmers 
to contribute to the conservation initiative.  
Ecological compensation regulations and laws as 
well as environmental awareness for EI protection. 
Zhang et al. 
2018 
2018 China Outcomes Empirical  Mitigate drought caused by 
climate change scenarios.  
Farmers voluntarily developed adaptation 
strategies to manage threatened water resources.    
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) mechanism 
raised Ecological Infrastructure funding. The 
government launched policies to protect water 
resources and investment in water infrastructures.  
Sheremet et 
al. 2018 
2018 Finland Intervention  Empirical  Mitigate risks from invasive 
forest pests and diseases 
The willingness of the general public to fund a PES 
scheme depended on benefits from a forest 
The policy designers to encouraged spatial 
coordination in the uptake of PES-type contracts to 
deliver control measures on disease, risks and 
maximise social benefits 
Riley et al. 
2018 
2018 UK Outcomes 
Intervention
s 
Perspective
, theoretical 
Not defined  Not defined To encourage more joined-up thinking by offering 
payments to farmers to form collective agreements 
for conservation. 
Hardy et al. 
2018 
2018 Australia Policy 
review 
Empirical  Protecting biodiversity on 
private land  
Revolving funds were used by conservation 
organisations to buy, resell and permanently 
protect private land with important ecological 
values.  
Conservation organisations used ‘revolving funds’ 
to acquire private land with high conservation value 
and then resell it to new owners, adding an in-
perpetuity conservation covenant or easement. The 
agreement permanently restricts activities harmful 
to biodiversity.  
Reinhardt et 
al. 2018 
2018 Vietnam Need and 
Willingness 
Empirical  Establishment of plantations, 
abstinence from logging a plot 
of mature plantation trees or 
refrain from cutting indigenous 
hardwood trees. 
Willingness to engage in contracts was motivated 
by compensation  
REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation) social safeguards 
promoted the improvement of local communities' 
livelihoods. 
Arnott et al. 
2019 
2019 England Intervention  Empirical Promote ‘greening’, 
‘sustainability’ and ‘ecosystem 
services’ approaches to land 
management.  
Environmental, economic and social benefits of 
result-oriented schemes outcomes drive 
willingness. Factors such as climate change, the 
behaviour of neighbouring farmers and the 
breeding, feeding, and migration patterns of mobile 
species all have the potential to influence 
willingness to participate. 
Used action-based AES, as a delivery mechanism 
for ecosystem services 
Note: The listed studies excluded sources who could not fill all the gaps. Those were included in the reference list to save the space. 
These studies are ordered by publication dates. 
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Appendix 5: A table that shows relationships between concepts and willingness determinants for 
the second research data chapter.  
Relationship descriptor Explanation  
 Is associated with  
 Contradicts  
 Is part of  
 Is a property of  
 Is a  
 
 
Based on: Dempster, M. (2003). Systematic review. In Miller, R. L., & Brewer, J. The A-Z of Social Research. London: 
SAGE. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9780857020024  
                                                          
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
